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The Triggering Function of Sale of Control
Doctrine
Einer Elhauget
Controlling blocks of stock generally command a premium.
Current doctrine allows controlling shareholders to sell without
sharing this control premium in most, but not all, circumstances.
The two dominant schools of academic thought on sales of control
agree on one point: this current doctrine is wrong. Under one
school of thought, the equal sharing school, noncontrolling share-
holders should always have the right to share in a sale of control at
a premium price.' Under the other school of thought, the deregu-
latory school, premium control sales should never have to be
shared.2 Both schools regard current doctrine as unsatisfactory.
This gulf between doctrine and academic analysis is unfortu-
nate. Because neither school offers a coherent justification for cur-
rent doctrine, courts adjudicating sale of control cases lack princi-
ples to guide the resolution of doctrinal ambiguities. This might be
tolerable if the ambiguities were relatively minor. But, as I show in
Part I, here the applicable law resembles less a deterministic doc-
trine than a dialectic between a general rule and a set of amor-_
phous exceptions. The result is that the adjudication of sale of con-
trol cases has a seemingly unpredictable and rudderless quality.
This gulf is also unfair to the doctrine. Notwithstanding the
apparent uncertainty and the critique from both schools, current
sale of control doctrine reflects an ingenious response to a problem
endemic to all legal doctrines: the inevitability that any legal doc-
trine will deter some desirable behavior and fail to deter some un-
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desirable behavior. In an imaginary ideal world, the legal system
would deter every harmful transfer of control without deterring
any beneficial transfers. Compared to this ideal, however, any real
legal system will underdeter the unproductive transfers and
overdeter the productive transfers. We cannot eliminate overdeter-
rence and underdeterrence; we can only optimize them by mini-
mizing their collective ill effect.
Under this framework, the strengths and weaknesses of the
two schools' approaches can easily be stated. For reasons explained
more fully in Part II, sharing premium control sales with noncon-
trolling shareholders helps screen out unproductive control trans-
fers, but unequal sharing is often necessary to complete productive
control transfers. Accordingly, the equal sharing approach lessens
the underdeterrence of harmful control transfers, but increases the
overdeterrence of beneficial transfers. The deregulatory approach
does the opposite: lessening overdeterrence but increasing
underdeterrence.
Recast in this manner, much of the modern debate between
the two schools can be seen as turning on empirical questions
about the magnitude of the over- and underdeterrence associated
with the two approaches. Those who believe most control transfers
are productive argue for making the doctrine more deregulatory
because their belief suggests overdeterrence is a larger problem
than underdeterrence. Those who believe many control transfers
are harmful argue for the equal sharing approach because their be-
lief suggests underdeterrence is the larger problem.
The key point missed by both schools, Part III argues, is that
the two approaches are good at different things. Thus, if we can
segregate classes of cases-so that one class of cases contains
mainly productive transfers, and the other class of cases contains
mainly harmful transfers-then we can do better with a legal re-
gime that uses both approaches. All we need is a doctrine that trig-
gers either the equal sharing or deregulatory approach, depending
on whether the control transfer is likely to be harmful or
productive.
Current sale of control doctrine, Part IV shows, performs pre-
cisely this triggering function. Where the circumstances suggest
that the control transfer has made control abuses more likely or
harder to police, current doctrine imposes liability for failure to
share the premium control sale. The doctrine thus effectively trig-
gers the equal sharing approach when underdeterrence is especially
troublesome. Where there are no such special circumstances,
underdeterrence is less troublesome than overdeterrence, and the
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doctrine triggers the deregulatory approach. The result is to opti-
mize over- and underdeterrence better than any single approach
could.
Part V addresses questions concerning the extent to which
this triggering approach should be mandatory rather than an alter-
able default.
I. THE AMORPHOUs NATURE OF CURRENT DOCTRINE
Absent special circumstances, the general rule is that the
owner of a controlling block of stock is free to sell it at a premium
price unavailable to the noncontrolling shareholders.' What consti-
tutes those special circumstances has never received a clear com-
prehensive answer in the case law. One can, to be sure, categorize
the circumstances under which control sellers have been held liable
into three exceptions to the general rule permitting unshared pre-
mium control sales. But, as we will see, each exception is more
amorphous and open-ended than the one before it, and the excep-
tions could, if read broadly, easily engulf the general rule.
A. Sales to Suspected Looters
Sellers receiving a control premium have been found liable if,
at the time they sold control, the sellers had reason to suspect the
buyers planned to use the control to loot the corporation.4 Where
the circumstances raise such a reasonable suspicion, the control
seller must investigate the prospective buyer and, if the investiga-
tion confirms the suspicions, the seller cannot sell the controlling
block of stock to that buyer.
One difficulty in applying this exception is whether the duty
to investigate should be considered affirmative or instead condi-
tional on suspicious circumstances. The bulk of the courts have
3 See Robert Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4 at 478 (Little, Brown, 1986); Thomas L. Ha-
zen, Transfers of Corporate Control and Duties of Controlling Shareholders - Common
Law, Tender Offers, Investment Companies - And a Proposal for Reform, 125 U Pa L Rev
1023, 1026-27 (1977). See also Ronald J. Gilson, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acqui-
sitions 621 n 6 (Foundation, 1986) (collecting cases); Robert W. Hamilton, Private Sale of
Control Transactions: Where We Stand Today, 36 Case Western Res L Rev 248, 249 & n 6,
261 & n 35 (1985) (same).
4 See Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 263 & n 37 (cited in note 3)(collecting
cases); Hazen, 125 U Pa L Rev at 1030-33 & n 41 (cited in note 3) (same); F. Hodge O'Neal,
Sale of a Controlling Corporate Interest: Bases of Possible Seller Liability, 38 U Pitt L Rev
9, 16-23 (1976) (same). Control sellers who do not receive a control premium have also been
found liable for selling to suspected looters, but that is under the far more deferential duty
of care review. See text accompanying notes 143-46.
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concluded the duty is conditional: where the circumstances known
to the seller do not raise a reasonable suspicion, no special investi-
gation is required.' But two courts have concluded that the duty to
investigate should apply even absent suspicious circumstances.
The argument for an affirmative duty relies on the same pre-
mise underlying the conditional duty-that control sellers have a
relative advantage (over noncontrolling shareholders) in assessing
prospective control buyers.7 Because this relative advantage ap-
plies even when the facts initially known to the seller raise no sus-
picion, why not utilize this advantage in all cases by giving control
sellers an affirmative duty to investigate all buyers? The courts
have offered no real explanation, other than the lame rationale
that an affirmative duty to investigate all control buyers would put
an "unwarranted" restriction on the power to sell stock.8 But that
hardly seems satisfactory. The power to sell is already restricted by
the duty not to sell under suspicious circumstances. Without guid-
ing principles, how do we know the point at which the level of re-
striction becomes "unwarranted?"
The relevance of this to actual legal practice may seem lim-
ited. Whether or not we can explain the decision to impose only a
conditional duty, the decision to require circumstances raising a
reasonable suspicion has been made in most jurisdictions. But the
same difficulty underlies what might seem a mere line-drawing
question: how can we tell which circumstances are sufficient to
form a reasonable suspicion and thus invoke the duty to investi-
gate? If we have no clear policy grounds for imposing the condi-
tion, then we have no policies to guide our tribunals in deciding
when the condition has been met. What constitutes a "reasonable
suspicion" will instead be adjudicated based on unarticulated intu-
See, for example, Delano v Kitch, 663 F2d 990, 995 (10th Cir 1981); Clagett v Hutch-
inson, 583 F2d 1259, 1262-63 (4th Cir 1978); Harris v Carter, 582 A2d 222, 233-34 (Del
Chanc 1990). See also Doleman v Meiji Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F2d 1480, 1483-84 (9th Cir
1984); Seagrave Corp. v Mount, 212 F2d 389, 393 (6th Cir 1954).
' See Northway, Inc. v TSC Industries, Inc., 512 F2d 324, 342 (7th Cir 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 426 US 438 (1976); Estate of Hooper v Government of Virgin Islands, 427
F2d 45, 47 (3d Cir 1970).
7 See Alfred Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 Harv L Rev 986, 1025-26 (1957);
Tina Schiff, Sale of Control: The Equal Opportunity and Foreseeable Harm Theories
Under Rule 10b-5, 32 Bus Law 507, 520 (1977).
1 Levy v American Beverage Corp., 265 AD 208, 38 NYS2d 517, 526-27 (1942). Levy
went so far as to require actual knowledge of the buyer's intent to loot. This has been re-
jected in favor of the reasonable suspicion standard, see, for example, Harris, 582 A2d at
233-34, but the courts doing so have focused on protecting shareholders and have offered no
other rationale for not making the duty affirmative.
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itions of what seems reasonable to the tribunal in question. The
predictable result is uncertainty."
Moreover, given the circumstances that can be viewed as sus-
picious, the exception for suspected looters could practically over-
throw the general rule. One important issue, which has so far split
the courts, is whether a large control premium should alone be suf-
ficient grounds for finding reasonable suspicion.' 0 The potential for
undermining the general rule is clear. If the existence of a substan-
tial premium suffices to establish a reasonable suspicion, then in
effect the duty to investigate applies affirmatively in most cases.
And if, as often, no special investigation has been made, the excep-
tion will displace the general rule permitting unshared premium
control sales.
B. Sales of Office
It is considered a "sale of office," and per se illegal, for corpo-
rate fiduciaries who are not selling a controlling block of stock to
accept payment for installing particular individuals into corporate
positions.1 But it is generally legal for the seller of a control block
to agree, as part of the sale of control, to insert the control buyer's
nominees into corporate offices.'2
The latter rule is grounded on the premise that the buyer of
the control block would eventually be able to vote his nominees
into office at the next shareholder meeting. Accordingly, courts
reason that forbidding agreements to insert the buyer's nominees
I See Note, Opportunity Lost: More of the Same in Sale of Corporate Control Cases,
58 Neb L Rev 891, 895-99, 908 (1979) (arguing that precedents under the reasonable suspi-
cion test are factbound and conclusory, offering little guidance).
"0 Compare Clagett, 583 F2d at 1262 (holding that 300% premium was not enough to
trigger duty); Levy, 265 AD at 218 (same for 200% premium); and McDaniel v Painter, 418
F2d 545, 548 (10th Cir 1969) (premium not grounds for suspicion) with Dale v Thomas H.
Temple Co., 186 Tenn 69, 208 SW2d 344, 352 (1948) (concluding that 180% premium was a
"badge of fraud") and Gerdes v Reynolds, 28 NYS2d 622, 651, 654, 658 (Sup Ct 1941) (rely-
ing heavily on high premium). See generally Noyes Leech, Transactions in Corporate Con-
trol, 104 U Pa L Rev 725, 793-95 (1956).
" See Hill, 70 Harv L Rev at 997-98 & n 33 (cited in note 7) (collecting cases); O'Neal,
38 U Pitt L Rev at 14 n 9 (cited in note 4) (same); Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.2 at 480
(cited in note 3).
12 See Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.2 at 480-81 (cited in note 3); O'Neal, 38 U Pitt L
Rev at 12 & n 8 (cited in note 4) (collecting cases); Schiff, 32 Bus Law at 509 n 9 (cited in
note 7) (same). This is usually accomplished through seriatim resignations of the corpora-
tion's directors. First one original director resigns, and the remaining directors exercise their
power to fill a board vacancy by voting for one of the buyer's nominees. See Rev Model Bus
Corp Act § 8.10(a) (ABA, 1984). Then another original director resigns, and the remaining
directors and the new director vote in another of the buyer's nominees-and so on, until all
the original directors have been replaced by the buyer's nominees.
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would serve no useful purpose.' 3 Barring such agreements would
also pose obstacles to control transfers. Control buyers would have
to either (1) incur the costs of holding a special shareholder meet-
ing; 14 (2) delay buying the control block until the next annual
meeting; or ,(3) risk making a large investment in a corporation
they cannot control for some months.' 5 Since the failure to allow
immediate office transfers would accomplish nothing useful, these
costs, delays, or risks would by definition be unnecessary. They
would, however, deter or hinder many sales of control.'6
The main doctrinal problem with allowing control sellers to
transfer offices has been determining what percentage of the corpo-
rate stock suffices to constitute a control block. Under the bright-
line position advocated by Judge Friendly, agreements to transfer
offices should not be valid unless the block sold constitutes over
fifty percent of the voting stock.'7 But other judges and courts
have held that blocks of less than fifty percent can suffice if they
constitute "working control."' 8
On behalf of the bright-line approach, Judge Friendly stressed
the difficulty of determining when working control exists, and ar-
gued that presuming control from a large minority stake would vio-
l See Essex Universal Corp. v Yates, 305 F2d 572, 577 (2d Cir 1962) (Lumbard); Hill,
70 Harv L Rev at 996-97 & n 29 (cited in note 7) (collecting cases). See also Andrews, 78
Harv L Rev at 557 (cited in note 1); Adolph A. Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate
Control, 50 Cornell L Q 628, 632,(1965).
" Nominally, the control seller may sometimes pay for these added expenses. But they
will raise the control premium the buyer must pay. Also, if the control block is over 50% of
the outstanding shares, in some states (like Delaware) the shareholders may take action
without a meeting. Delaware General Corporation Law, Del Code Ann § 228 (Michie 1992).
But in other states, and in the more usual case where the control block is under 50%, a
special shareholder meeting must be held to elect new directors. See Del Code Ann § 211;
William M. Fletcher, 5 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 1996.1 at
11-12 (Callaghan, perm ed 1987 & 1991 Supp) (collecting statutes and cases from various
states).
16 If the board is staggered, and agreements to have the board resign are void even if
they do not provide for the installation of the control buyer's nominees, then the first and
second solutions are not feasible, and the control buyer would have to incur the risk of
noncontrol for years.
16 See Essex, 305 F2d at 577-79 (Lumbard). The risks associated with not being able to
change the board would, for example, almost certainly cause buyers to discount the price
they would pay for controlling blocks of stock. At lower prices, fewer sales of control would
occur.
17 See id at 581 (Friendly concurring).
18 See id at 579 (Lumbard); Carter v Muscat, 21 AD2d 543, 251 NYS2d 378, 381 (1964);
Heckman v Ahmanson, 168 Cal App 3d 119, 214 Cal Rptr 177, 187 n 6 (1985); Liboff v
Allen, 1975 WL 1961, *5 (Del Chanc).
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late "principles of corporate democracy.""9 Presumably these dem-
ocratic principles might be violated because sometimes, under the
working control test, the litigation process will result in the instal-
lation of a board that the shareholders would not have approved in
an election. Such a misinstallation might occur if litigation results
in an erroneous finding of working control. More likely, it might
occur because no one is willing to fund litigation to establish a lack
of working control.20
Avoiding the costs of adjudicating working control is an im-
portant advantage of the bright-line position. But this advantage is
offset by an important disadvantage: for control blocks under fifty
percent,21 the bright-line position imposes the same costs, delays,
or risks that would be imposed in all cases if the law always
banned agreements to transfer offices. Buyers of control blocks
under fifty percent would have to either pay for a special share-
holders meeting, delay buying control until the next annual meet-
ing, or risk non-control for some months. And if the block in fact
sufficed to provide working control, these costs, delays, or risks
would be unnecessary.
As for the corporate democracy point, it also cuts two ways.
There is no guarantee the incumbent directors could, without any
sale of control, win an election in between the annual elections.
And it is even less likely the incumbents could win such an election
19 Essex, 305 F2d at 581 (Friendly concurring). Judge Friendly also claimed that agree-
ments for seriatim resignations would violate shareholder expectations. Id. But this seems
belied by Judge Friendly's own concession that "many contracts" were then being written to
provide for such transfers of office. Id. In any event, his shareholder expectations argument
faces the problem usually faced by expectation arguments in legal policy analysis: expecta-
tions will likely reflect whatever the law says. Retrospectively, expectations are likely to be
uncertain if the legal issue has not yet been decided. Moreover, the important policy ques-
tion is what the prospective law should be, and the answer to that question turns not on the
expectations shareholders have, but on the expectations we want them to have.
20 In derivative actions, plaintiffs' attorneys may be willing to bring a case in hopes of
getting reimbursement. But under the corporation law of many states, such reimbursement
will depend not only on winning but on collecting a common fund. See Fletcher v A.J.
Industries, 266 Cal App 2d 313, 72 Cal Rptr 146, 150 (1968). Such common funds may not
be available if damages cannot be proved, and where damages are low, the common fund
may be insufficient to cover the necessary attorney fees. Other states allow the reimburse-
ment of attorney fees where litigation secures a non-monetary benefit. See Mills v Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 US 375, 392 (1970); Fletcher, 72 Cal Rptr at 150. But even in those
states a winning attorney will have to incur the risk the tribunal will deny fees because the
non-monetary benefit was not substantial. See, for example, Braude v Automobile Club, 178
Cal App 3d 994, 223 Cal Rptr 914, 921 (1986). Given these limitations and risks, plaintiff's
attorneys will often forego litigation even if they have a realistic chance of proving the per-
centage was insufficient to constitute working control.
21 These are, of course, the only cases where the split between the bright-line and work-
ing control test makes a difference.
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when the buyer of a control block favors other nominees. 22 Thus,
having no sale of control and no special election, or having a sale of
control and no agreed transfer of offices, seems just as likely to
contravene the wishes of the shareholders as allowing the seller of
a control block to install the buyer's nominees.
The same tensions re-emerge in applying the "working con-
trol" test: how can courts in sale of control cases decide what per-
centage of the corporation's stock is large enough to provide work-
ing control? The New York courts have held that 3 percent is not
enough,23 but that 9.7 percent might be. 4 The exact dividing line
remains unclear.2 5
Other than gut intuition, it is hard to see what guides these
results under the current doctrinal framework. It is surely not
whether the seller in fact exercised working control, because any
shareholder who possesses the influence to arrange the seriatim
resignation of the board of directors certainly exercises actual con-
trol.26 Nor have courts, in sale of office cases, been willing to rely
on whether the given percentage of stock has, in the past, sufficed
to elect a majority of the corporation's board. Instead, the courts
have avoided setting a coherent legal standard by asserting the
2'2 Through 1985, there were no reported cases where, after directors were installed as
part of the sale of a control block comprising less than 50% of the corporate stock, the
shareholders rejected those directors at the next annual election. See Hamilton, 36 Case
Western Res L Rev at 269 (cited in note 3). I have found no reported cases since 1985
either.
2 Matter of Caplan v Lionel Corp., 20 AD2d 301, 246 NYS2d 913 (1964).
2 See Carter v Muscat, 21 AD2d 543, 251 NYS2d 378 (1964).
25 See also American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations § 5.16 comment f (Proposed Final Draft 1992) (stating that the percent-
age of stock cannot be "significantly less" than a majority of the voting stock, but giving no
indication of what that means nor any policy guidance about how to interpret it).
28 See id (stating that an office transfer accompanying the sale of an insufficient block
of stock would constitute a violation of fiduciary duty even if the seller "controls the
board"). The issue would be different if the group of selling shareholders were the members
of the board. In such a case, the directors might sell a trivial amount of shares at a high
premium in return for exercising their authority as directors to transfer offices. Here, how-
ever, I am concerned with cases where the possession of less than a majority of shares suf-
fices to influence non-selling directors.
27 See Carter, 251 NYS2d at 380. The unwillingness to find working control in such sale
of office cases contrasts with definitions and adjudications of control under securities regula-
tions, which "define 'control' to mean 'the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to
direct or cause the direction of management,'" Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, 4 Securities
Regulation 1708 (Little, Brown, 1990) (collecting and quoting SEC regulations), and where
the "ability to control the proxy machinery of a corporation when the stockholders are
widely scattered is strong evidence of control." Id at 1721.
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question is a "matter of fact," 8 thus effectively delegating the is-
sue to case-by-case lawmaking by factfinders.
Another line of judicial opinions potentially has more far-
reaching significance. This line suggests that office transfers inci-
dental to control sales are invalid if the payment to the control
seller exceeds the premium the control block alone commands, and
thus in part reflects payment for the office transfer.29 One possible
limitation, suggested by some cases, is that this line might invali-
date transactions only if the relevant contract designates a sepa-
rate payment for the transfer of offices.30 But this limitation has no
substantive significance. Even without such separate designation,
agreements to transfer offices have economic value and will inevi-
tably affect the price paid for a control block; part of the premium
is thus always payment for the office transfer.3 If this economic
reality is recognized, this line of cases could easily turn the sale of
office exception into a vehicle for reversing the general rule when-
ever, as often happens, an immediate transfer of offices is
provided.
C. Sales of Corporate or Collective Opportunities
Finally, courts have sometimes held controlling shareholders
liable when a control transaction effectively "diverts" a corporate
or collective opportunity. Corporate opportunities are business op-
portunities that "belong" to the corporation.2 The concept of col-
lective opportunities has more potential sweep, including any op-
28 Carter, 251 NYS2d at 381. Judge Lumbard's standard, that stockholdings constitute
working control if the stock would suffice to elect a majority of the board assuming a neutral
proxy machinery, see Essex, 305 F2d at 575, does not contain the open-ended nature of
factfinding, because the standard is purely speculative.
29 See Gerdes, 28 NYS2d at 653-55, 660; Benson v Braun, 286 AD 1098, 145 NYS2d
711, 712 (1955); Snyder v Epstein, 290 F Supp 652, 655 (E D Wis 1968); Bosworth v Allen,
168 NY 157, 61 NE 163, 165 (1901); Perlman v Feldmann, 219 F2d 173, 179 (2d Cir 1955)
(Swann dissenting), rev'd 219 F2d 173 (2d Cir 1955). See also Hill, 70 Harv L Rev at 994-95
(cited in note 7).
3o See Porter v Healy, 244 Pa 427, 91 A 428, 430 (1914) (invalidating transaction with
separate escrow fund).
' Besides following dubious reasoning, the cases that turn on separate designation have
little practical significance because parties can easily get around them by making sure that
one payment is made for both the stock and the agreement to transfer offices. One might
wonder why, if nothing substantive follows from separate designations, agreements ever con-
tain them. The answer appears to be that separate designations provide a procedural advan-
tage in enforcement. If the seller fails to actually transfer the offices after the shares are
bought, the buyer can simply withhold a payment rather than having to sue for damages
that would be hard to measure and might be hard to collect.
2 Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.3 at 482 (cited in note 3).
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portunities that "should," or "ought to," be developed for all the
shareholders.33 The meaning of these terms is, as we will see,
fraught with difficulty.
1. Diverted business opportunities.
The most celebrated case involving the diversion of a corpo-
rate business opportunity is Perlman v Feldmann,4 which con-
cerned a corporation that manufactured steel during the Korean
War. Because of ethical price guidelines then in place, there were
widespread shortages of steel. These ethical guidelines prevented
the corporation from increasing its profits by raising steel prices to
the levels that steel users would pay. Feldmann and his family,
however, realized healthy profits by selling their control block
(thirty-seven percent of the stock) at a premium to a syndicate of
steel users, who presumably intended to use their purchased con-
trol to sell themselves steel at the ethically fixed prices.
The court held the control sellers liable on the ground that
they had "siphon[ed] off for personal gain corporate advantages to
be derived from a favorable market situation."3 5 The sellers were
thus obligated to share the control premium with the noncontrol-
ling shareholders. The court made clear, however, that it was not
holding that the control premium must be shared whenever a con-
trol block is sold to an interested customer.3 e Rather, the key dis-
tinction was that here the control sale occurred during a time of
market shortage imposed by ethical guidelines.3 7 Accordingly, the
Perlman exception has generally been interpreted to embrace lia-
bility only when the sale of control diverts, or allows the diversion
of, a corporate business opportunity: here the opportunity to maxi-
mize corporate profits from the steel scarcity.33
The difficulty with this interpretation is that there was no
proof that any corporate business opportunity had actually been
diverted." The court dismissed this difficulty, stating: "The corpo-
3 Id at 482, 487-88.
-1 219 F2d 173 (2d Cir 1955).
35 Id at 176.
36 Id at 178.
37 See id.
38 See Thompson v Hambrick, 508 SW2d 949, 952-53 (Tex Civ App 1974); Clark, Cor-
porate Law § 11.4.3 at 482-85 (cited in note 3).
" See Perlman v Feldmann, 129 F Supp 162, 176 (D Conn 1952), rev'd on other
grounds, 219 F2d 173 (2d Cir 1955). If the judgment had been predicated on such proof, it
would seem that the control buyers, not the control sellers, would have been primarily lia-
ble. See Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 509 (cited in note 1).
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rate opportunities of whose misappropriation the minority stock-
holders complain need not have been an absolute certainty .... If
there was possibility of corporate gain, they are entitled to re-
cover." 40 But this dismissal undermines the court's distinction, for
any sale of control raises the risk that the control buyer will divert
corporate business opportunities, or otherwise exploit corporate
control, to profit at the corporation's expense.
With the stopping point for the Perlman duty so poorly ex-
plained, it is not surprising that many commentators have con-
cluded that the case's natural implication was that the duty to
share the control premium should apply in all cases. 41 This infer-
ence goes too far: Perlman did draw a distinction, and that distinc-
tion is, I will argue in Part IV, explicable on policy grounds. But
unless given a better articulated policy explanation, the Perlman
exception casts an amorphous and threatening shadow on the gen-
eral rule permitting unshared premium control sales.
2. Converted offers.
Another line of corporate/collective opportunity cases con-
cerns offers made to the corporation that are converted into sales
of the controlling shareholders' stock.42 In the typical case, the
buyer first offers either to buy corporate assets or to effect a corpo-
rate merger, but the controlling shareholder declines this offer and
instead sells the buyer her controlling block of stock. A profit that
could have accrued to the corporation and to all the shareholders
proportionate to their holdings is, in this manner, effectively di-
verted to the original controlling shareholder. The cases are split
on the question of whether the control seller is liable in such
circumstances. 43
To be sure, the sale of the control block could be said to have deprived the corporation
of the opportunity to merge or sell the corporate assets to the steel syndicate at the same
premium. See id at 511. But all unshared premium sales of control could be said to deprive
the corporation of such opportunities. Any conclusion that such opportunities are "corpo-
rate opportunities" would thus presuppose a conclusion that the law should overturn the
general rule permitting unshared premium control sales.
40 219 F2d at 176-77.
"I See Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 514-15, 524-26 (cited in note 1); Berle, 50 Cornell L
Q at 634-40 (cited in note 13).
42 See Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.3 at 485-87 (cited in note 3); Gilson, Law and
Finance at 622 (cited in note 3).
43 Compare Brown v Halbert, 271 Cal App 2d 252, 76 Cal Rptr 781 (1969) (finding
liability) and Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v Seltzer, 227 Pa 410, 76 A 77 (1910)
(same) with Tryon v Smith, 191 Or 172, 229 P2d 251 (1951) (no liability) and Treadway
Companies, Inc., v Care Corp., 638 F2d 357, 375-78 (2d Cir 1980) (same).
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Some cases finding such control sellers liable seem to turn on
the seller's failure to disclose the buyer's offer to the corporation or
the other shareholders." But, where the seller is truly a controlling
shareholder, nondisclosure seems generally immaterial.4 s A control-
ling shareholder could fully disclose a buyer's initial offer to the
corporation, but then exercise her control to have the corporation
formally reject the merger or sale of assets.46 The real question in
such cases is substantive: whether the controlling shareholder
should be able-with or without disclosure-to exercise her control
to prevent the corporation from accepting the buyer's offer and in-
stead sell only the shareholder's control block.
Another basis for liability is the notion that, because the buyer
inquired first about purchasing (or merging with) the corporation,
the sale of a control block took a "corporate" or "collective" oppor-
tunity.47 This conclusion, however, seems to beg the question. Why
should it matter whether the buyer inquired first about buying the
control block or about buying corporate assets? In either case, one
could well conclude that all the controlling shareholder took was
the opportunity to sell the controlling block of stock, and this cer-
tainly "belonged" to the controlling shareholder rather than to the
corporation. Or, conversely, one could say that in any case where
the buyer does first inquire about purchasing the control block, the
seller should know that the buyer is really interested in controlling
corporate assets and, accordingly, the seller should first offer the
" See Low v Wheeler, 207 Cal App 2d 477, 24 Cal Rptr 538, 543 (1962); McManus v
Durant, 168 AD 643, 154 NYS 580 (1915); Dunnett v Am, 71 F2d 912 (10th Cir 1934);
American Trust Co. v California West. States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal 2d 42, 98 P2d 497
(1940). Brown v Halbert emphasized the duty of full disclosure, but also suggested that
some other affirmative duties existed that might require making the offer available to the
other shareholders. 76 Cal Rptr at 793-94.
" Issues regarding liability for material nondisclosures, rather than for the control
seller's substantive acts, are beyond the scope of this article. Such cases generally fall into
two categories. First, sometimes the seller does not control the corporate board, and disclo-
sure might have some effect because the board might have accepted the buyer's offer. Such
nondisclosures would, if the seller learned about the buyer's offer in his corporate capacity,
presumably violate the seller's general duty of loyalty. Second, and more commonly, some-
times a person learns through a corporate position about a control buyer's interest and then,
without disclosure, buys shares for resale or advises other shareholders to sell their shares.
In such circumstances, many cases have imposed liability under state law or Rule 10b-5. See
Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 279 nn 99, 101, 102 (cited in note 3) (collecting
sources); Leech, 104 U Pa L Rev at 730-74 (cited in note 10). See also ALI, Principles of
Corporate Governance §5.16(a), comment d and illus 4 (cited in note 25) (stating that such
nondisclosure would violate fiduciary duties).
'e See Gilson, Law and Finance at 622 (cited in note 3).
' See Brown, 76 Cal Rptr at 781; Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.3 at 485-87 (cited in
note 3).
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buyer (or other potential buyers) a corporate merger or sale of as-
sets.48 How the offer was pitched seems substantively irrelevant.
Even more question-begging is the formulation given in Brown
v Halbert: that the control seller must take steps to make the offer
available to the other shareholders whenever a sale of just the con-
trol block would "prejudice" the other shareholders. 49 Clearly, non-
controlling shareholders would always be better off if the offer to
purchase shares at a premium were made available to them.
Whether they are "prejudiced" by the failure to extend the offer to
them would seem to turn on whether they are entitled to have the
seller make the opportunity available to them or not. But whether
they have such an entitlement is precisely what the doctrine is
supposed to tell us. If Brown means to say that the noncontrolling
shareholders are always entitled to have the controlling share-
holder take steps to make the buyer's offer available to them, then
the case goes a long way toward mandating a general rule of equal
sharing.
3. Diverted collective opportunities.
The most far-reaching, and fuzzy, type of cases involve trans-
actions affecting control which divert collective opportunities that
are "deemed to belong to" all the shareholders.50 As usual, how-
ever, such formal labels do not aid analysis. What is important is
the policy analysis underlying the conclusions about which oppor-
tunities belong to, or ought to be developed for, all the sharehold-
ers. Unfortunately, the case law provides some conclusions, but
does not explain the underlying analysis.
The main case is Jones v H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 which con-
cerned a savings and loan association. Because the association had
issued few shares, the per-share book value was too high ($1,131)
for the shares to trade easily. The defendants, who owned eighty-
five percent of these shares, transferred their shares to a holding
company, receiving 250 shares in the holding company for each
savings and loan share. With lower per-share prices, the holding
company stock sold better on the public market, reaching a value
of $8,800 for 250 holding company shares. The transaction thus ef-
fectively created a public market for the defendants' stock that in-
creased its value nearly eight-fold. The holding company then of-
48 See Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 519 (cited in note 1).
4, 76 Cal Rptr at 793-94.
50 See Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.3 at 487-88 (cited in note 3).
51 1 Cal 3d 93, 81 Cal Rptr 592, 460 P2d 464 (1969).
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fered the equivalent of $2,400 for each savings and loan share held
by the plaintiffs, who owned the remaining fifteen percent of the
savings and loan stock.
The court held that, if the alleged facts were true, the defend-
ants would be liable for failing to share the holding company op-
portunity with the minority shareholders. Although the case did
not involve an actual sale or transfer of control to a new control
group, the court concluded that a rule of "inherent fairness to the
minority" applied "in any transaction where control of the corpo-
ration is material."52 The court further supported its holding by
stating that "[m]ajority shareholders may not use their power to
control corporate activities to benefit themselves alone or in a
manner detrimental to the minority. ' 53 Implicitly, then, the court
appears to have concluded that the transaction was "unfair," used
the power to control "corporate activities," and was "detrimental"
to the minority.
All three of these tests are conclusory. The "fairness" test is
unhelpful because it sets forth no criteria for concluding what is
fair and what is not. The court emphasized that the defendants
had a choice: they could have developed a market for all the shares
(through a stock split or by allowing all shareholders to participate
in the holding company) or they could have, as they did, created a
market for only their eighty-five percent control block. 4 But the
court does not explain why choosing the latter was unfair. After
all, a similar choice is open in garden-variety sales of control. The
defendants could share the control premium with all shareholders
(by merging, selling corporate assets, or allowing all shareholders
to participate in the stock sale) or they could execute a sale that
confers the whole control premium on the controlling shareholders.
Nor does the court explain how it arrived at the conclusion
that transferring controlling shares to a holding company uses the
power to control "corporate activities." One could have as easily
concluded that such a transfer merely exercises powers of stock
ownership. Or one could conclude that any sale of control uses the
power to control corporate activities. The formal label the court
put on the activities in Ahmanson reflects a policy conclusion: that
the defendants should not benefit themselves alone when under-
" Id at 474, 476. See also Thompson v Hambrick, 508 SW2d 949, 953 (Tex Civ App
1974) (including, as one exception to the general rule permitting premium control sales,
cases where there is "inherent unfairness to the minority shareholders").
53 460 P2d at 471.
Id at 474-75.
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taking the particular activities at issue. But the analysis underlying
this policy conclusion remains unexplained.
Similarly conclusory is the court's apparent determination
that the transaction was "detrimental" to the minority. Surely the
minority did not do as well as the controlling shareholders. But the
minority was better off than it would have been had the holding
company not been formed: the minority shareholders were now be-
ing offered $2,400 per share instead of $1,131. Whether or not the
transaction was "detrimental" to the minority thus turns on one's
baseline understanding of what the minority was entitled to: if the
baseline is an equal share of the control transaction, the minority
was harmed; if the baseline is the initial status quo, the minority
was helped. The real policy question is how we derive the baseline.
Read broadly, any of these tests could easily overturn the gen-
eral rule permitting unshared premium control sales. A court need
simply conclude that the choice to pursue an unshared premium
control sale is unfair, that a sale of control uses the "power to con-
trol corporate activities," or that failing to share the premium con-
trol sale is "detrimental" to the noncontrolling shareholders. The
Ahmanson court declined to go that far, but it also declined to
state any other coherent limits to its exception. Instead it stated:
Although a controlling shareholder who sells or exchanges his
shares is not under an obligation to obtain for the minority
the consideration that he receives in all cases, when he does
sell or exchange his shares the transaction is subject to close
scrutiny.55
Thus, all we learn from Ahmanson is that the particular transac-
tion at issue was considered illegal. What else might be considered
illegal we are left to guess.
That Ahmanson does have limits, albeit unclear in scope, is
illustrated by Honigman v Green Giant Company.56 Honigman in-
volved the recapitalization of a corporation that initially had two
classes of stock: Class A had all the voting power, but only 0.1 per-
cent of the equity; Class B had no voting rights, but 99.9 percent of
the equity. In effect, under the recapitalization plan, Class A stock-
holders traded 91 percent of their voting power to Class B stock-
5 Id at 478. Similarly, the court stated: "Nor do we suggest that a control block of
shares may not be sold or transferred to a holding company. We decide only that the cir-
cumstances of any transfer of controlling shares will be subject to judicial scrutiny when it
appears that the controlling shareholders may have breached their fiduciary obligation to
the corporation or the remaining shareholders." Id at 476.
56 309 F2d 667 (8th Cir 1962), aff'g 208 F Supp 754 (D Minn 1961).
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holders in exchange for 9 percent of Class B's equity. This plan
was approved by all Class A shares and 92 percent of Class B
shares. The plaintiff, a dissenting Class B shareholder, sued on the
ground that the Class A shareholders were, in effect, selling their
power to control the corporation without sharing the proceeds uni-
formly among all equity stock.
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument, holding that the
recapitalization was valid. As we will see in Part IV, there are
sound policy reasons for the court's conclusion. But for present
purposes the point is the tension with Ahmanson's formal logic.
Here control was certainly material to the transaction, but the
court was willing to conclude that the transaction was "fair" be-
cause the initial controlling shareholders (Class A) received value
in proportion to the extra value their shares naturally possessed. 57
One could, of course, have said the same about the controlling
shares in Ahmanson. Similarly, one is hard pressed to distinguish
Honigman from Ahmanson on the issues of whether they con-
cerned control over "corporate activities" or "detriment" to non-
controlling shareholders. In both cases, voting control was the com-
modity being sold, and while the noncontrolling shareholders
ended up better off than they were initially, they ended up worse
off than they would have if the proceeds of control had been
shared equally.
D. Conclusion
The current law governing sales of control resembles less a
doctrine than a dialectic. Although the general rule remains that
premium control sales are legal,5 the exceptions that pockmark
Honigman, 309 F2d at 671-72, 208 F Supp at 758-59.
'8 Some commentators have expressed the view that this general rule may largely have
been reversed in those states that have enacted control share acquisition statutes. See Ron-
ald J. Gilson and Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 135-36
(Foundation, 1991 Supp); Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 281-85 (cited in note 3).
These statutes, designed to regulate hostile takeovers, typically provide that stock purchases
that put a buyer above certain thresholds (ranging from 20% to 50% of the corporate stock)
must be approved by a majority of the noncontrolling shareholders. See Gilson and Black,
Law and Finance at 135-36. Because the legislative purpose was focused on hostile take-
overs, one might argue that the statutes do not apply to private sale of control cases. See
Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 285. But such an argument faces an uphill battle
since nothing in the statutory language purports to limit the statutes to hostile takeover
situations. In any event, there is a more practical reason why these statutes should largely
be irrelevant to the private control sale context: the statutes generally allow the corporation
to opt out of the statutory requirement by changing the corporate charter or bylaws. See
Ohio General Corporation Law, Ohio Rev Code Ann § 1701.83.1 (Page 1991); Hawaii Busi-
ness Corporations Act, Hawaii Rev Stat Ann § 415-172(a) (Michie 1988); Missouri General
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that general rule are sufficiently open-ended that one might better
describe the doctrine as a battle between rule and anti-rule. No
wonder scholars are in widespread agreement that, as currently
formulated, the doctrine is "confused" and "chaotic."5 The prob-
lem is not just the inevitable doctrinal ambiguities that beset all
areas of law. The problem is that the doctrine lacks any coherent
principles or policies that might guide the resolution of these am-
biguities and suggest limits to the exceptions. The fault for this
must be said to rest in part with current legal scholarship, which,
as the next Part describes, does not provide a policy framework
useful for resolving current doctrinal issues.
II. THE Two DOMINANT SCHOOLS OF ACADEMIC CRITIQUE
Current legal scholarship has failed to provide a coherent pol-
icy foundation for current legal doctrine. For those scholars dis-
posed to defend it, the best justification they have been able to
muster for current doctrine is that it reflects some rough balance
between considerations of efficiency and the demands of justice or
fairness.60 But such a conclusory explanation hardly seems satis-
factory since it offers no guidance to judges or legislators in decid-
ing how to apply, or whether to reform, current doctrine. One can
justify any outcome of a case and any particular rule in the doc-
trine by concluding that the balance struck was "proper," or in-
stead condemn it by calling the balance "improper."
Most academic commentators have simply agreed that current
doctrine is misguided. The critiques generally fall into two schools
of academic thought. The equal sharing school argues that, where
it fails to give all shareholders the right to share in premium con-
trol sales, current doctrine leaves noncontrolling shareholders vul-
nerable to unfair treatment and economic exploitation. The der-
egulatory school argues that, where it requires the sharing of
and Business Corporation Law, Mo Rev Stat Ann § 351.407(1) (West 1992); Wisconsin Busi-
ness Corporations Law, Wis Stat Ann § 180.1150(2) (West 1992); Indiana Business Corpora-
tion Law, Ind Code Ann § 23-1-42-5 (West 1989). Because an existing holder of control will
usually have little problem arranging for such an opt out, the statutes are unlikely to apply
to sales of control blocks. Instead, the opt out provisions will tend to limit the statutes'
practical effect to cases where the current control group is hostile to the purchase offer.
"' Hazen, 125 U Pa L Rev at 1040-41 (cited in note 3); O'Neal, 38 U Pitt L Rev at 49
(cited in note 4). See also Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 251 (cited in note 3)
(agreeing that "exceptions are not readily bounded"); Hill, 70 Harv L Rev at 986, 1038
(cited in note 7) (decrying "confusion" and "uncertainty" of the doctrine).
"0 See Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 248, 284-85 (cited in note 3).
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control premiums, current doctrine decreases efficiency by deter-
ring value-enhancing transfers of control.
Before analyzing the policy arguments underlying these two
schools, Section A dispenses with various formalistic arguments
that have been invoked on behalf of one side or the other. This
formalistic debate is unhelpful because the arguments on both
sides are conclusory: the formal labels reflect, but do not articulate,
policy conclusions, and the policy analyses generating those con-
clusions must be debated on their own merits. Sections B and C
then proceed to analyze the policy arguments for and against the
equal sharing and deregulatory approaches.
A. Dispensing With Conclusory Arguments
Many scholars use arguments based on intuition or formal cat-
egorization to reach conclusions about sale of control doctrine.
Adolph Berle started the ball rolling by arguing that control was a
"corporate asset" and that any control premium thus "belongs,"
and must be paid, to the corporation. 1 David Bayne has argued in
a series of articles that controlling shareholders should be regarded
as trustees and that control premiums thus represent "bribes" for
choosing the trustee's successor that are "morally illegitimate. '6 2
Others assert that intuitive or widespread notions of fairness re-
quire sharing the control premium with minority shareholders.6 3
These claims provide fruitful grist for classroom discussion
but are all vulnerable to opposing intuitions or categorizations.
One can argue that a corporation cannot "own" the power to con-
trol itself and that the power to control a corporation is not an
"asset" the corporation can put on its balance sheet, but is rather
an attribute of stock ownership. 4 One can also reject the assertion
1 See Adolph A. Berle, Jr. and Gardner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property 243-45 (MacMillan, 1947); Berle, 50 Cornell L Q at 629, 637-39 (cited in note
13); Adolph A. Berle, Jr., "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 Colum L Rev 1212, 1221 (1958).
Under this theory, an unshared premium control sale might be regarded as an effective
looting of the corporation. See Leech, 104 U Pa L Rev at 812-13 (cited in note 10).
62 See Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 250 n 7 (cited in note 3) (collecting
cites to Bayne's ten articles on the subject); Thomas L. Hazen, The Sale of Corporate Con-
trol: Towards a Three-Tiered Approach, 4 J Corp L 263, 271-74 (1979) (summarizing
Bayne's argument). David Bayne's articles have been consolidated in his book, The Philoso-
phy of Corporate Control (Loyola, 1986).
11 See Richard W. Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 Cal L Rev 1, 18 n 68, 31,
39 (1956). See also Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 259 (cited in note 3) (noting
fairness argument).
See J. Spencer Letts, Sales of Control and the Rights of Minority Shareholders, 26
Bus Law 631, 639 (1971); Hazen, 125 U Pa L Rev at 1025 (cited in note 3); Hill, 70 Harv L
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that control premiums are inherently illegitimate, noting either the
many authorities that have distinguished the duties of trustees and
corporate fiduciaries, or that any analogy tells us little about what
specific duties a controlling shareholder should have. 5 And it is
not difficult to find people who will object to the unfairness of
preventing controlling shareholders from selling their stock at
whatever price they wish.
66
Pursuing this debate is, however, unhelpful. One can go round
and round about whether or not control is a corporate asset and
whether premiums are bribes or unfair, but in the end such argu-
ments can be resolved satisfactorily only by deciding how we be-
lieve the law should treat unshared premium control sales. The
particular label one attaches to such sales reflects some unarticu-
lated legal policy conclusion. Unless one wishes to be conclusory, or
to obscure the underlying policy conclusion, arguments about la-
bels are unhelpful. One should move directly to the policy argu-
ments underlying each school.
B. The Equal Sharing School
The equal sharing approach provides that, whenever a control
block is sold, the noncontrolling shareholders must be given an op-
portunity to sell the same proportion of their shares at the same
premium price. 7 A controlling shareholder could not, for example,
Rev at 1006-10 (cited in note 7). See also Clark, Corporate Law §11.4.4 at 491 (cited in note
3) (noting argument). For cases taking this view, see Tryon v Smith, 191 Or 172, 229 P2d
251, 254 (1951); Perlman v Feldmann, 129 F Supp 162, 182, 185 (D Conn 1952), rev'd 219
F2d 173 (2d Cir 1955); Delano v Kitch, 663 F2d 990, 995, 998 (10th Cir 1981); Christophides
v Porco, 289 F Supp 403, 405 (S D NY 1968); Honigman, 309 F2d at 670.
"' See Hazen, 4 J Corp L at 272-73 (cited in note 62); Saul Levmore, A Primer on the
Sale of Corporate Control, 65 Tex L Rev 1061, 1067-69 (1987); Gregory Alan Lewis, The
Legitimate Transfer of Corporate Control: A Paradigmatic Study of the Custodial Con-
cept, 13 Creighton L Rev 463, 474 n 85 (1979). See also Victor Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology
in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65 Mich L Rev 259, 259 (1966) (noting that
range of restrictions on corporate fiduciaries varies from "inhibitions as rigorous as those
imposed on express trustees to limitations almost as flexible as those governing arm's length
dealings among strangers").
66 See generally Hill, 70 Harv L Rev at 1038 n 150 (cited in note 7) (questioning Jen-
nings's assertions about general sentiment and practice on selling control blocks at a pre-
mium unavailable to noncontrolling shareholders).
6 See Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 506, 515-45 (cited in note 1); Brudney, 65 Mich L
Rev at 296-99 (cited in note 65); Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Cor-
porate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 Cal L Rev 1072, 1122-26 (1983); Clark, Corpo-
rate Law § 11.4.5 at 494-98 (cited in note 3); Leech, 104 U Pa L Rev at 837-39 (cited in note
10); Jennings, 44 Cal L Rev at 1, 29-31 (cited in note 63). See also Hazen, 125 U Pa L Rev at
1062-67 (cited in note 3) (advocating equal sharing approach for small close and large public
corporations and a more flexible approach for intermediate corporations); Hazen, 4 J Corp L
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sell her entire fifty percent control block to a buyer offering $50/
share. Instead, each shareholder would be entitled to the opportu-
nity to sell fifty percent of his holdings at $50/share. If all take the
opportunity, the controlling shareholder could only sell a twenty-
five percent block and would remain a twenty-five percent share-
holder. If the controlling shareholder insists on selling all her
shares, the sale of control could proceed only if the noncontrolling
shareholders consent or the control buyer purchases 100 percent of
the shares.
An ingenious argument for this approach was developed by
William Andrews. He began by observing that control transfers can
either benefit or harm the corporation."8 A control buyer might, for
example, believe that once in control he can increase the corpora-
tion's efficiency: this would enhance corporate value and benefit all
the shareholders. Or a buyer might instead intend to use control to
loot the corporation, engage in self-dealing, or take corporate op-
portunities: this would divert value from the corporation to benefit
the buyer at the cost of the noncontrolling shareholders. An equal
sharing rule, Andrews then argued, tends to permit the beneficial
control transfers and selectively screen out the harmful transfers.6
Andrews reasoned that the rule would prevent a sale of control
only when the buyer will not purchase one hundred percent of the
corporate stock, the seller insists on selling her entire control
block, and the noncontrolling shareholders withhold consent to a
sale of the control block.7" These obstacles should not, he felt, pose
an insurmountable problem if the control transfer would enhance
corporate value. The value-enhancing purchaser should be happy
to buy (at the same premium price) as many shares above the con-
trol block as he can, because the more he owns, the more he profits
from the increase in corporate value. 1 If he lacks the funds, he
should still be able to get financing for the extra share purchases
by persuading the capital markets that the control transfer will en-
hance corporate value.72 If the capital markets mistakenly fail to
provide financing, the original controlling shareholder should be
at 274-83 (cited in note 62) (same). Although offering somewhat different remedies, Berle
and Bayne have argued for sharing requirements that are sufficiently close to the equal
sharing approach to put them in the same school. See sources cited in notes 61-62.
08 See Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 517-19, 522-28 (cited in note 1). See also Clark,
Corporate Law § 11.4.5 at 494-95 (cited in note 3).
o Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 527. See also Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.5 at 496-97.
10 Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 517 (cited in note 1).
Id at 519, 528. See also Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.5 at 496 (cited in note 3).
72 Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 519, 531. See also Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.5 at 497.
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willing to remain a proportional shareholder if she believes the
transfer will increase corporate value.73 And, if all else fails, non-
controlling shareholders should be willing to consent to the control
transfer if they believe corporate value (and thus the value of their
shares) will be enhanced.7 The equal sharing rule would thus
block a control transaction only if the control buyer will not com-
mit enough funds to purchase the whole corporation, and her plans
to increase corporate value convince neither the capital markets,
nor the original controlling shareholder, nor the noncontrolling
shareholders. In such circumstances, Andrews concluded, it is
doubtful the control transfer would have enhanced corporate
value.
Conversely, in any sale of control where noncontrolling share-
holders exercise equal participation rights, either (1) the control
buyer will purchase one hundred percent of the corporation's
shares, or (2) the original controlling shareholder will remain a
proportional shareholder. Either type of purchase tends to exclude
control transfers that harm the corporation. A purchaser who buys
one hundred percent of a corporation cannot profit by harming the
corporation since he harms only himself.75 In fact, the greater the
percentage purchased by the control buyer, the less likely he can
profit at the corporation's expense.76 If instead the original control-
ling shareholder will remain a proportional shareholder, he will
have powerful incentives to investigate the buyer and to refuse to
sell if the transfer seems likely to harm the corporation.7 7 Indeed,
because the original controlling shareholder would experience the
same benefits and risks as the other shareholders, he would have
an incentive to sell only when the expected value of the sale of
control was positive for all the shareholders.
The equal sharing approach thus offers the promise of selec-
tively screening out non-productive transfers, while avoiding the
" Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 519, 532 (cited in note 1). See also Gilson, Law and
Finance at 617 (cited in note 3).
" Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 519, 531.
"' Id at 517, 528-29. See also Brudney, 71 Cal L Rev at 1126 (cited in note 67). As we
will see, an exception to Andrews's argument is a buyer who purchases an investment com-
pany, see below at note 161, or who can otherwise expropriate corporate assets to which
others (such as creditors or preferred shareholders) have a superior claim. See text accompa-
nying notes 161-63.
6 Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 528-29 (cited in note 1). See also Clark, Corporate Law §
11.4.5 at 496 (cited in note 3).
71 Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 517-18. See also Brudney, 71 Cal L Rev at 1126 (cited in
note 67).
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difficulty of litigating various issues under current doctrine.
78
Courts would no longer have to decide when looting was reasona-
bly foreseeable, when a sale of office occurred, or when a corporate
or collective opportunity was diverted by the control transaction.
Instead, for every sale of control, courts would merely have to de-
termine whether the noncontrolling shareholders were given an op-
portunity to sell. This equal opportunity rule would provide a pro-
phylactic incentive structure that self-deters non-productive sales
of control, without requiring proof of the post-transfer harm, often
subtle or hard to prove, that might befall the corporation. 79
C. The Deregulatory School
In contrast to the equal sharing school, the deregulatory
school argues that the law should never require the controlling
shareholder to share premium control sales with the noncontrolling
shareholders.8 0 This Section presents the arguments that could be
marshalled on behalf of this position, some of which I have refor-
mulated, extended or added myself to make the best case for it.
The main point is that, for a variety of reasons that follow, an
equal sharing rule would, in fact, discourage many productive
transfers of control.First, even if everyone believes the buyer intends value-en-
hancing action, both the control buyer and the control seller have
sound reasons for avoiding the divided or incomplete control that
often follows a pro rata sale of the control block. Suppose, for ex-
ample, the original owner of a thirty percent control block and all
the other shareholders participate in the sale of a thirty percent
control block to a purchaser. Such a pro rata purchase means that
the buyer gets a thirty percent block but is left to contend with
another shareholder (the original controlling shareholder) who re-
mains holding a twenty-one percent block. The supposed control
buyer thus ends up with a large opposing shareholder who can dis-
Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 518, 537. See also id at 557 (stating that office transfers
should be valid whenever the seller complied with the equal opportunity rule).
" Id at 518 (on subtlety and difficulty of proof).
SO The strongest proponents are Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel. See Easter-
brook and Fischel, 91 Yale L J at 698 (cited in note 2) ("Any attempt to require sharing
simply reduces the likelihood that there will be gains to share."). Others are less explicit or
extreme than Easterbrook and Fischel, but nonetheless seem sufficiently sympathetic to
their deregulatory arguments to put them in the same school for present purposes. See, for
example, Gilson, Law and Finance at 617-20 (cited in note 3); Gilson and Black, Law and
Finance at 137-39 (cited in note 58); Larry Ribstein, Business Associations 1003-06 (Mat-
thew Bender, 2d ed 1990).
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rupt the buyer's effective control. The control seller ends up with
large stockholdings in a corporation she cannot control.
Investing in such divided or incomplete control is unlikely to
appear attractive to either side."' Even when all parties seek to en-
hance corporate value, they will inevitably disagree about the best
corporate policy. Divided control thus produces conflict. The costs
of such conflict will make the investments less valuable to both the
control buyer and control seller.
Even without such direct conflict costs, the incomplete control
that results from pro rata sales has less inherent value than com-
plete control. A major reason for paying a control premium is the
greater security and confidence that come from controlling the
management of one's investment.8 2 The controlling shareholder is,
after all, the investor who suffers least from the agency costs that
discount the value of corporate investments.8 3 Other investors have
George Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to
Professor Andrews, 32 U Chi L Rev 420, 426 (1965); Letts, 26 Bus Law at 641-42 (cited in
note 64). The original controlling stockholder may also wish to retire from active involve-
ment in the corporation because of age or a desire to pursue other interests. A rule that
required him to remain a significant shareholder would in effect oblige him to continue
monitoring the corporation, thus making any retirement incomplete and somewhat less at-
tractive. At the margin, this would discourage some desirable control transfers, and the in-
ability to completely liquidate the investment and retire would discourage some initial in-
vestments of capital and effort necessary to build up corporate value.
" See Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 526 (cited in note 1) (conceding that this is the most
important reason for paying a control premium); Larry G. Meeker and 0. Maurice Joy,
Price Premiums for Controlling Shares of Closely Held Bank Stock, 53 J Bus 297, 299
(1980) (listing reduced uncertainty as a reason for control premiums). See generally Richard
A. Booth, Discounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 Cal L Rev 1053 (1991)
(arguing share discounts are explicable by a downward sloping demand curve that results in
part because the last share is bought by the shareholder who perceives the greatest risk,
including the risk of management malfeasance).
S See generally Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305, 308 (1976)
(defining agency costs as the sum of: (1) monitoring costs; (2) bonding costs; and (3) residual
loss from the agent's divergent incentives). Note that this different exposure to agency costs
follows even if the control seller and buyer do nothing to in fact abuse their control. It is
sufficient that noncontrolling shareholders are, to a greater degree than controlling share-
holders, subject to the risk of control abuse, to governance by management whose judgment
may honestly differ from theirs, and to being disfavored by corporate decisions (such as the
timing of dividends or distributions) that must inevitably favor some shareholders over
others because shareholders vary in their liquidity needs, tax circumstances, or risk prefer-
ences. Moreover, noncontrolling shareholders may face proportionately higher monitoring
costs because they must spread those costs over fewer shares and because they have an
additional person to monitor-the controlling shareholder. See also Booth, 79 Cal L Rev at
1078-79 (cited in note 82) (arguing that shares have more value to shareholder with control
than to shareholder without control). See also id at 1057 & n 6 (collecting sources arguing
that shareholders discount share value to compensate for their lack of power to sell underly-
ing corporate assets); Richard A. Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and
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to worry that the controlling party will abuse control or fail to pur-
sue the management policies they feel are best; the controlling
party can be fairly confident that he will suffer only from his own
misjudgments.
A control buyer will thus pay less for the uncertain control
that follows a pro rata sale than he would pay to have the clear
control that comes with having the only control block. For the
same reason, the control seller will value a large, but noncontrol-
ling, block of stock at less per share than she would value a con-
trolling block. She will thus demand a higher per share premium to
sell a pro rata share of her control block than she would demand to
sell the whole control block. With the price buyers are willing to
pay reduced, and the price sellers are willing to accept increased, a
pro rata rule will result in fewer beneficial control transfers.
Second, it may not be feasible for control buyers aiming to
enhance corporate value to buy one hundred percent of the corpo-
ration's stock.8 4 Capital markets might sometimes be imperfect, re-
fusing to finance sound corporate plans.8 5 Further, the plans may
be confidential, difficult to communicate, or insufficiently concrete
to satisfy lenders, who favor risk-free investments. More impor-
tant, like equity, debt also carries agency costs.86 And like noncon-
trolling shareholders, those providing debt capital can never have
the same confidence in the plan as the control buyer because only
the latter enjoys the advantage of knowing he will be positioned to
protect his investment. Because lenders must discount for greater
agency costs, they will value the investment less than the control
buyer.8 7 Lenders may thus refuse to finance control transfers that
offer sound investments to control buyers, or lenders may demand
the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 60 NYU L Rev 630, 633-38 (1985) (arguing that management
values stock more than other shareholders because management has reduced exposure to
risk). That this different exposure to agency costs (rather than actual abuses of control)
might explain a buyer's willingness to pay a premium for controlling shares (over the stock
market price paid for noncontrolling shares) is curiously not mentioned by Easterbrook and
Fischel, and generally seems to have been missed in the sale of control literature. See
Levmore, 65 Tex L Rev at 1061-62 (cited in note 65) (not listing it as reason for control
premium). See also Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.5 at 495 (cited in note 3) (not mentioning it
in his analysis); Brudney, 71 Cal L Rev at 1124 (cited in note 67) ("If the transfer offered no
possibility of enhancing enterprise value, the only reason for the buyer to pay a premium
would be to appropriate some portion of the minority's assets to itself.").
I See Javaras, 32 U Chi L Rev at 425-26 (cited in note 81); Letts, 26 Bus Law at 643
(cited in note 64).
15 See Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.5 at 497 (cited in note 3) (noting, though doubting,
this possibility).
86 Jensen and Meckling, 3 J Fin Econ at 333-42 (cited in note 83).
8 See text accompanying note 83.
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risk-adjusted rates of return greater than the control buyer re-
ceives or can afford to pay, given the stock premium demanded by
the sellers. Finally, we must remember that modern theory sug-
gests that corporate debt/equity ratios are determined not only by
tax considerations, but by the corporation's optimal tradeoff be-
tween the agency costs of equity and the agency costs of debt.", To
require the control buyer to finance the purchase of the entire cor-
poration is in effect to require a deviation from this optimal trade-
off, and that deviation imposes a cost (in increased overall agency
costs) that will discourage desirable control transfers.
Third, even if they can raise the capital, control buyers often
have legitimate reasons to be unwilling to purchase one hundred
percent of a corporation. They may be unwilling to purchase all
the shares themselves because they can enjoy lower risks by diver-
sifying their investments among various corporations.8 9 True, as
Dean Clark points out, they could diversify their risk by finding
co-investors for the purchase.90 But this does not mean, as Dean
Clark concludes, that the diversification point really depends on
the point that capital markets may be imperfect.91 For co-investors
pose the same problem as a pro rata purchase that leaves the origi-
nal controlling shareholder with a large stake: the co-investors un-
dermine the buyer's control and increase the risk of conflict.9 2 This
decreases the value of the investment for the control buyer. Thus,
even if co-investors can be found, the control buyer may legiti-
mately be unwilling to invest with them.
Fourth, value-enhancing sales of control may often require an
unequal division of the premium. Controlling shareholders may,
because they reap benefits from nonshareholder relations with the
corporation, insist on a price greater than the average value of the
shares under the control buyer's management. In such cases, a pro-
ductive control transfer can occur only if the original controlling
shareholder receives more per share than the noncontrolling share-
holders. If control sellers must share the control sale, they will re-
8 Jensen and Meckling, 3 J Fin Econ at 342-51, 355-56 (cited in note 83). Because debt
receives more favorable tax treatment than equity, in that interest is deductible but divi-
dends are not, tax law may already distort debt/equity ratios. But a sale of control rule that
required control buyers to take on more debt would only exacerbate this distortion.
89 See Javaras, 32 U Chi L Rev at 426 (cited in note 81); Jensen and Meckling, 3 J Fin
Econ at 348-49 (cited in note 83).
" See Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.5 at 497 (cited in note 3).
91 See id.
See text accompanying notes 81-83. See also Meeker and Joy, 53 J Bus at 301 (cited
in note 82) (concluding that controlling shares are worth more to smaller control groups).
" Easterbrook and Fischel, 91 Yale L J at 708-11, 716 (cited in note 2).
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ceive less of the total premium, and fewer control transfers will
result.14
To be sure, in the above situations one could theoretically still
complete beneficial control transfers under equal sharing rules by
asking the noncontrolling shareholders to consent to an unshared
premium control sale.95 But even if the noncontrolling sharehold-
ers view the control transfer as beneficial, there are two problems
with requiring their consent. One is that although beneficial con-
trol transfers will benefit all the shareholders, the parties will have
to bargain over the distribution of the gains created by the trans-
fer. Often this bargaining will break down due to strategic behavior
or be stymied by the transaction costs of getting all the sharehold-
ers to consent. 6 Two, free-rider problems are likely to prevent in-
dividual shareholders from consenting even though it would be in
the noncontrolling shareholders' collective interests to consent.9 7
Individually, they may reason that refusing to consent offers a
large gain" (because those who withhold consent will get a larger
premium if the control transfer occurs) but little cost (because any
individual shareholder's refusal to consent will have little effect on
whether the shareholders as a group consent). Collectively, the re-
sult is that the noncontrolling shareholders may reject a control
transfer that would have benefited them all.
In addition to stressing that sharing rules may discourage
value-enhancing control transfers, the deregulatory school ques-
tions whether equal sharing rules do much to prevent abuses of
control. Existing owners of control blocks can, after all, abuse their
control without ever selling it."' That control transfers are some-
times followed by control abuses does not mean that the control
transfers increased the number of control abuses that would have
resulted.
o Of course, some of the control transfers that do not occur may be harmful to the
corporation. Undesirable control transfers, as well as desirable ones, may require an unequal
division of the total premium. See Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 256 (cited in
note 3). I thus do not put the same weight on this argument as Easterbrook and Fischel,
who present it as the main ground for their deregulatory position.
" See Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 534 (cited in note 1).
*s See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 Yale L J 31, 95-96 & nn 246-47 (1991) (describing. obstacles to Coasean bar-
gaining). See also Easterbrook and Fischel, 91 Yale L J at 711 (cited in note 2) (expressing
concern about bargaining over the distribution of gains where the fair distribution is
indeterminate).
11 See Elhauge, 101 Yale L J at 36-37 (cited in note 96) (describing free-rider problem).
See also Easterbrook and Fischel, 91 Yale L J at 710 (cited in note 2) (expressing concern
about free riding in tender offer context).
"s See Easterbrook and Fischel, 91 Yale L J at 718 (cited in note 2).
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Easterbrook and Fischel further argue that looters are hard to
detect in advance and that the penalties directly imposed on loot-
ers could simply be increased to deter looting more effectively. 99
Accordingly, they conclude that laws penalizing the looters are bet-
ter suited for preventing looting than either current doctrine or the
equal sharing approach. The latter are both likely to result in false
positives, preventing control transfers that would not have harmed
the corporation.100 Instead, Easterbrook and Fischel advocate rely-
ing more on stock market prices to determine whether the transac-
tion leaves the noncontrolling shareholders worse off than
before.' 01 If the stock market price of noncontrolling shares has not
decreased, or if the noncontrolling shareholders receive a price
greater than the stock market price that prevailed before the
transaction, Easterbrook and Fischel conclude the control transac-
tion should be legal.
The assumptions on which this analysis is based-that looters
are hard to detect in advance, that other legal alternatives can ade-
quately prevent looting, and that a stock market price test will ac-
curately identify any harmful transfers-are all suspect. Easter-
brook and Fischel base their conclusion that advance detection of
looters is difficult on their premise that looting is "by nature a one-
time transaction" because looters acquire reputations that prevent
them from repeating their scams.102 But many looters repeat their
scams a number of times and could often be detected by routine
credit checks. 0 3 Moreover, if the law did not penalize selling to
suspected looters, it is hard to see why a looter's reputation would
prevent her from obtaining control over corporations.
Easterbrook and Fischel's assumption that the law could sim-
ply increase sanctions to deter looting is also problematic. As I ex-
plain in Part III, the law generally cannot increase expected sanc-
tions for undesirable conduct without also increasing expected
sanctions for desirable conduct that might be mistaken for unde-
sirable conduct. The concern about punishing, and deterring, de-
sirable conduct is especially high if the matter concerns-as so
99 Id at 719.
100 Id.
,01 Id at 698, 707-08, 717-18.
101 Id at 719.
10 See Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 267-68 (cited in note 3). Indeed, one of
the principal sale-to-looters cases involved a looter who had 38 prior unsatisfied judgments,
54 actions pending against him, and had actually defrauded the seller's predecessor in inter-
est. See DeBaun v First Western Bank & Trust Co., 46 Cal App 3d 686, 120 Cal Rptr 354,
357 (1975).
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many sale of control cases have-more subtle abuses of control,
because it will be easier to mistake such abuses for desirable con-
duct. If one assumes that the sanctions for looting or other control
abuses have already been set to optimize over- and underdeter-
rence, then sanctions cannot simply be increased to deter any loot-
ers or control abusers who gain control. A prophylactic rule that
tends to screen out control buyers who seem likely to loot or abuse
control can thus improve the overall desirability of conduct.
The stock market prices on which Easterbrook and Fischel
prefer to rely are often relevant to determining whether a control
transfer was harmful. But relying solely on an ex post assessment
of stock market prices would be unwise. Unrelated factors and
trends affect the stock market and may result in an increase for a
particular corporation's stock despite a new post-transfer abuse of
control.10 4 Further, stock market prices may often understate the
value of a corporation's stock,105 particularly when those selling
(and buying) control have access to information not available to
the general market. Finally, the harm inflicted by the control
transfer may be prospective-the diversion of a benefit that would
have otherwise accrued to the corporation-and thus not mani-
fested by a decline in stock market prices.10 6
More generally, relying on stock market prices is a two-edged
sword. In their examples, Easterbrook and Fischel use the stock
market test to identify only cases where liability should not attach.
Consistency would, however, indicate .that they should also be will-
ing to conclude that liability should attach whenever, after a-con-
trol transaction, the stock market price of the noncontrolling
shares declines. If so, they are in essence arguing that judges
should review all control transfers, and impose liability if and only
if the transfer is non-productive under a market price test. It is far
from obvious, given the risk of litigation error, that such case-by-
case assessments are preferable to a more general rule.
I will have more to say on the choice between case-by-case and
rule-based approaches in Part III. At this point, it suffices to note
that the deregulatory approach will fail to screen out some harmful
transfers that would have been screened by equal sharing rules.
Thus, the deregulatory school depends on the claim that the pro-
104 See, for example, Gilson, Law and Finance at 606 (cited in note 3).
,o5 See Booth, 79 Cal L Rev at 1055-56 (cited in note 82); Reinier Kraakman, Taking
Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Mo-
tive, 88 Colum L Rev 891 (1988).
106 See Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.3 at 484-85 (cited in note 3).
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ductive transfers discouraged by the equal sharing approach are
more important than the harmful transfers the equal sharing ap-
proach screens out. This claim, in turn, is based on an empirical
assumption explicitly asserted by Easterbrook and Fischel: that
control transfers are generally value-increasing. 107
III. MIXING APPROACHES TO OPTIMIZE OVERDETERRENCE AND
UNDERDETERRENCE
Given the analysis in Part II, present academic debate has fo-
cused on the likelihood that the equal sharing approach will deter
beneficial or harmful control transfers and particularly on empiri-
cal questions regarding the relative frequency of beneficial and
harmful control transfers. °8 To those who believe premium control
sales generally enhance corporate value, the deregulatory approach
seems preferable. Those who believe many control transfers are
harmful favor the equal sharing approach. But with the empirical
evidence scant, much of the scholarly jury is still out.
If the question is how best to make a choice between the equal
sharing approach and the deregulatory approach, pondering these
empirical questions seems the best we can do. 09 But to focus ex-
clusively on these empirical questions is to miss the key lesson of
Part II's analysis: that the advantages and disadvantages of the
two approaches make them suitable for different case mixes. If we
can segregate cases into two classes, one with mainly desirable con-
trol transfers and the other with many undesirable ones, then it
does not matter whether, over all cases, most control transfers are
desirable or undesirable. We can use both approaches, each for a
different case mix, to optimize over- and underdeterrence better
than either approach alone could.
To understand this, however, we first need some general back-
ground on how the law inevitably results in over- and underdeter-
rence, and the different strategies the law can employ to optimize
them. I thus turn to those topics in Section A before explaining, in
I" Easterbrook and Fischel, 91 Yale L J at 705 (cited in note 2). See also Gilson and
Black, Law and Finance at 137-39 (cited in note 58) (citing empirical study to support this
assumption).
100 See Gilson and Black, Law and Finance at 137-39 (Supp 1991) (cited in note 58);
Ribstein, Business Associations at 1004 (cited in note 80); Brudney, 65 Mich L Rev at 297-
99 (cited in note 65); Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 252 (cited in note 3).
"'* As I explain below, however, it is a mistake to conclude that the deregulatory ap-
proach should be used if empirical studies demonstrate that most control sales are currently
desirable because the current mix may reflect the fact that current doctrine often imposes
an equal sharing rule. See text accompanying notes 133-35.
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Section B, how the law can employ a mixed approach to achieve
better results in sale of control cases.
A. Optimizing Overdeterrence and Underdeterrence
Because every legal regime must act on imperfect information,
no regime can hope to regulate behavior perfectly. 10 Generally, in-
formation is imperfect because the available information does not
cover all past conduct or is insufficient to determine with one hun-
dred percent accuracy exactly what happened. A murder may, for
example, have no witnesses, or the witnesses may provide a
description that could match more than one suspect. Often the le-
gal regime is stuck with imperfect information because what it
seeks to punish is a certain subjective state of mind, which cannot
be observed but can only be inferred from available observations.
We may, for example, know that a motorist ran over a pedestrian.
But did he do so carelessly, with reckless disregard, in a fit of pas-
sion, or to fulfill a plan of premeditated murder? The available ob-
servations may permit a good guess about the subjective state of
mind, but some uncertainty will always remain.
Finally, information may be imperfect because what we really
want is a forward projection, from a given past point, of what
seemed likely to occur. Sales of control provide a good example of
this. Ideally, we would permit every sale of control that, at the
time of the sale, had net positive expected value, but we would
prevent every sale of control that, at the time of the sale, had net
negative expected value. But projecting the expected value of a
transaction is, even with all the available information, an ex-
tremely uncertain task. Nor can we rely on determining whether,
in the end, corporate value increases or decreases (itself a difficult
issue), for that is affected by stochastic"' factors that may have
nothing to do with whether the control transfer itself was
desirable.
These information imperfections would exist even if we had a
costless regime that gathered all available information. The imper-
fections are even worse when we consider the costs and defects of
the litigation process. Collecting information is expensive. At some
point the costs of collection outweigh the benefits of increased ac-
110 This Section draws from the analysis developed in Part I of Einer R. Elhauge and
Stephen Bundy, Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, John M. Olin Working Papers in Law
& Economics, No 91-9 (Boalt Hall School of Law, 1991).
" "Stochastic" factors involve random variables, chance, or probability. Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary (Merridan, 1973).
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curacy.' 2 It is thus socially desirable for the legal regime not to
collect all the information that might, in theory, be available. Fur-
ther, litigants are not passive observers of the information-gather-
ing process. They can often withhold or suppress information unfa-
vorable to their cause.' 13 They might also miss or miscategorize
information, and thus fail to present it." 4 The information reach-
ing the tribunal is thus generally incomplete and often skewed." 5
As a result, even tribunals that accurately assess the presented
information will make errors. The likelihood of error is even
greater when one recognizes that tribunals often make mistakes
(unintentional or not) in assessing the presented facts or applying
the law to them."'
Any legal regime will accordingly err in two ways: (1) it will
fail to detect and punish some undesirable conduct, and (2) it will
mistakenly punish some desirable conduct. The first results in the
underdeterrence of undesirable conduct; the second in the
overdeterrence of desirable conduct. There are, generally speaking,
three recognized strategies for dealing with this problem. But while
the strategies may ameliorate the problem, none can escape it.
The first strategy is adjusting the actual penalties imposed. 1
Suppose, for example, the legal regime can only detect and punish
a given type of undesirable conduct one-third of the time. If the
law adjusts for this by tripling damages, it can make the expected
penalty for undesirable acts equal to the expected penalty that
would have resulted with one hundred percent detection and pun-
ishment. The problem, of course, is that this strategy also increases
the penalties mistakenly inflicted on desirable acts. This will in-
crease the expected penalty for engaging in desirable conduct. In-
creasing penalties can thus curb underdeterrence of undesirable
"' See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J Legal Stud 399, 399-400 (1973).
,,3 See Stephen McG. Bundy and Einer Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the
Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 Cal L
Rev 315, 323-26 (1991); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information
to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 Harv L Rev 565, 570-76
(1989).
114 Bundy and Elhauge, 79 Cal L Rev at 335-61 (cited in note 113).
,, There are sometimes strategies for dealing with that skew, but they cannot elimi-
nate over- and underdeterrence. See id at 380-95.
"1' Of course, often the law itself is vague or incomplete in defining what conduct is
undesirable. Such laws effectively give tribunals some discretion to determine desirability.
Because the exercise of this discretion will sometimes deviate from social norms of desirabil-
ity, it is another source of legal error.
'" See, for example, Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J Pol Econ 169 (1968).
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conduct only at the cost of increasing overdeterrence of desirable
conduct. The optimal level of sanctions will leave some desirable
conduct deterred, but fail to deter some undesirable conduct.1 '
A second strategy is to adjust the standard of proof.119 If the
underdeterrence of undesirable acts is a major concern, the regime
can lower the standard of proof so that a greater percentage of un-
desirable acts gets punished. Sometimes this is done indirectly, as
when a penalty is made civil instead of criminal, thus shifting from
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to proof by a preponderance of
the evidence. Other times the standard of proof may change not de
jure but de facto, as when the regime appoints judges who are
more sympathetic to prosecutors or plaintiffs. But any adjustment
has its costs: the lower the standard of proof, the greater the
overdeterrence of desirable "acts; the higher the standard of proof,
the greater the underdeterrence of undesirable acts.
Third, the system can adopt rules that avoid relying on infor-
mation that is difficult to collect or assess. 120 Contract law, for ex-
ample, adopted the objective theory of contract to lessen inquiries
into subjective intent. 2 ' Antitrust courts have adopted per se rules
of antitrust liability to avoid difficult inquiries into the net market
effects of particular restraints.'22 Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act prohibits any swing-trading by corporate insiders to
avoid inquiries into whether or not the insiders had knowledge of
material inside corporate information.'2 3 Such bright-line rules will
be more precise, in the sense that they are less likely to result in
either mistaken sanctioning of legal conduct, or mistaken non-
sanctioning of illegal conduct.' 24
Bright-line rules, however, have a well-recognized problem.
Because they focus on criteria that are easy to detect and prove,
their correlation to the desirability of the underlying conduct is
looser. The rules are over- and underinclusive: the scope of con-
duct deemed illegal includes (and thus overdeters) many desirable
118 See Steven S. Shavell, Optimal Sanctions and the Incentive to Provide Evidence to
Legal Tribunals, 9 Intl Rev L and Econ 3, 4-5 (1989) (demonstrating that setting the level
of sanctions for nonproduction of evidence in this manner may be optimal when the tribunal
cannot be sure whether a party is failing to produce evidence).
"19 See Posner, 2 J Legal Stud at 410-15 (cited in note 112).
120 See Issac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemak-
ing, 3 J Legal Stud 257 (1974).
1" See E. Allan Farnsworth, 1 Farnsworth on Contracts § 3.6 at 168-72 (Little, Brown,
1990).
122 See Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v United States, 356 US 1, 5 (1958).
123 See Reliance Electronic Co. v Emerson Electric Co., 404 US 418, 422 (1972).
1' See Ehrlich and Posner, 3 J Legal Stud at 261-64 (cited in note 120).
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acts, and excludes (and thus underdeters) many undesirable
acts. 2 5 Sometimes this greater over- and underinclusion means
that a bright-line rule will result in more over- and underdeter-
rence than a standard more closely correlated to the desirability of
the underlying conduct. But other times the greater error in apply-
ing the latter type of standard means that the bright-line rule will
result in less over- and underdeterrence1 26
The choice between a bright-line rule and a flexible standard
will thus depend on particulars concerning their relative over- and
underdeterrence. So will the choice between two different bright-
line rules. Some might be broader, so that they are less susceptible
to underinclusion or underdeterrence. Some might be narrower, so
that they are less susceptible to overinclusion or overdeterrence.
Depending on whether under- or overdeterrence is a greater con-
cern, a broad or narrow rule might seem advisable.
What corporate sale of control doctrine suggests is that, in ad-
dition to the three recognized strategies for addressing under- and
overdeterrence, a fourth strategy is possible. We might use two dif-
ferent rules, with different over- and underdeterrences, to maxi-
mum advantage by using a meta-rule to trigger each rule where its
over- or underdeterrence is least problematic. How this might be
accomplished by sale of control doctrine is the topic I turn to next.
B. Mixing the Two Approaches
In corporate law, the usual standard of desirability is economic
efficiency. 27 Sales of control are socially undesirable if they lower
corporate value; they are desirable if they enhance corporate value.
Corporate value will be lowered if the control buyer is more likely
than the control seller to mismanage, self-deal, loot, or otherwise
,21 See id at 268. See also United States v United States Gypsum Co., 438 US 422, 441
n 17 (1978) (recognizing that per se rules increase deterrence of desirable conduct).
126 See Ehrlich and Posner, 3 J Legal Stud at 275-77 (cited in note 120).
127 This may not always be the case. A control transfer might, for example, be undesir-
able, even if it makes the corporation more profitable, because the control buyer feels less
constrained by social mores regarding environmental pollution or deceptive business tactics.
The standard response of corporate law is that laws designed to directly regulate other mat-
ters, such as environmental law or consumer protection law, are better means of dealing
with such problems. See, for example, Clark, Corporate Law § 1.2.3 at 20-21, § 16 at 677-703
(cited in note 3). I shall have occasion to question that response in a forthcoming piece, but
the grounds for questioning it are not applicable here. In sale of control cases, the tradi-
tional conception of corporate law-that it concerns relations among shareholders and man-
agers, not between the firm and the outside world-seems applicable, and it implies adher-
ing to a normative standard of maximizing corporate value. See id § 1.2.3 at 17-19, § 16 at
688-90; Easterbrook and Fischel, 91 Yale L J at 700-03 (cited in note 2).
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abuse corporate control. Corporate value will be enhanced if the
control buyer is less likely to abuse control or has some plans for
operating the corporation more profitably. Corporate value will
also be enhanced if the control buyer derives greater value than
the control seller from the control block-because, for example,
the block better fits the buyer's risk-diversifying portfolio or be-
cause the seller wishes to retire from active management-and the
control transfer does not harm the corporation.
128
In theory, one might imagine tribunals deciding on a case-by-
case basis whether a control transfer is socially desirable or not.
129
But tribunals would often lack the information necessary to deter-
mine whether the control transfer enhances corporate value. Even
if tribunals did have all the necessary information, their projec-
tions of corporate value would often be faulty. Moreover, the direct
costs of such case-by-case decisionmaking-not just the legal ex-
penses, but the costs of delay and uncertainty-would be prohibi-
tive. It is thus not surprising that courts uniformly refuse to enjoin
sales of control even where plaintiffs produce evidence that harm is
likely to result. 30
Alternatively, the regime might use a bright-line strategy.
Both the equal sharing and deregulatory approaches represent this
type of strategy. The equal sharing approach merely requires a de-
termination of whether all the shareholders were offered an oppor-
tunity to participate in the control transfer. The deregulatory ap-
proach requires no information at all.
128 A more difficult question is whether a sale of control should be regarded as desirable
when it decreases the value of the noncontrolling shares, but increases the value of the con-
trol block by more. The answer to this question essentially turns on whether we use Pareto's
test or Kaldor-Hicks's (wealth-maximization) test as our measure of economic efficiency. See
Elhauge, 101 Yale L J at 53 n 95 (cited in note 96) (describing the difference between the
two tests). Easterbrook and Fischel implicitly use Pareto's test when they assert that sales
of control should always be valid, "subject to the constraint that other parties to the trans-
action be at least as well off as before the transaction." Easterbrook and Fischel, 91 Yale L J
at 698 (cited in note 2). Because current doctrine approaches this question indirectly, one
cannot say which measure of economic efficiency it attempts to maximize.
129 This is not as fanciful as it might seem. The Illinois statute struck down in Edgar v
MITE Corporation, 457 US 624, 627 (1982), essentially applied such an approach to hostile
takeovers by requiring the Secretary of State to allow only those takeovers that were "fair."
And Easterbrook and Fischel, although generally stressing a deregulatory approach, suggest
that control transactions should be allowed only when the stock market price for noncon-
trolling shareholders does not decrease. See Easterbrook and Fischel, 91 Yale L J at 698,
717-18 (cited in note 2). Such a test would, in effect, provide for case-by-case review by
courts under a stock market price test, with the possibilities for error mentioned above.
130 See Leech, 104 U Pa L Rev at 824 (cited in note 10); Comment, Sales of Control
and the Theory of Overkill, 31 U Chi L Rev 725, 742 n 79 (1964).
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The two rules have different advantages and disadvantages.
The equal sharing approach would lessen underdeterrence of
harmful transfers of control at the cost of increasing overdeter-
rence of beneficial transfers. It would lessen underdeterrence be-
cause, for the reasons discussed in Section II.B, it provides a pro-
phylactic screen that helps deter attempts to obtain control for
nonproductive ends such as abusing noncontrolling shareholders. It
would increase overdeterrence because, for the reasons discussed in
Section II.C, it would sometimes obstruct beneficial transfers of
control. 131
The deregulatory approach, conversely, would lessen
overdeterrence of beneficial transfers, but worsen underdeterrence
of harmful transfers. It would lessen overdeterrence by permitting
the unshared premium control sales that are sometimes necessary
to complete desirable transfers of control. It would worsen un-
derdeterrence by relying solely on the ordinary mechanisms of cor-
porate accountability to restrain post-transfer abuses of controlling
shareholders. Because those mechanisms are themselves imperfect,
eliminating the duty to share the premium control sale decreases
the deterrence of non-productive transfers.
Much of the modern debate between the equal sharing school
and the deregulatory school can thus be seen as turning on empiri-
cal questions about the magnitude of the over- and underdeter-
1"1 The equal sharing rule will also sometimes deter entrepreneurs from assembling
control blocks out of dispersed shareholdings. Efforts to assemble control blocks are costly,
and the willingness of entrepreneurs to incur those costs will in part depend on their ability
to reap the control premium upon resale. At the margin, then, control will be assembled less
often under an equal sharing rule. Of course, as with control transfers, assembling control
blocks can be beneficial or harmful to the corporation. But compared to control transfers,
assembling control blocks is much more likely to be beneficial because it wrests control from
managers who, given their relatively lower shareholdings, have more incentive to abuse con-
trol than a controlling shareholder.
Also relying on the need for incentives to create control blocks, Ronald Gilson con-
cludes that minority shareholders should prefer a rule that provides such an incentive by
allowing some self-dealing by controlling shareholders. See Gilson, Law and Finance at 618
(cited in note 3). See also Ribstein, Business Associations at 1005-06 (cited in note 80).
Gilson bases this conclusion on the premise that the formation of a control block increases
the value of all shares by reducing agency costs. See Gilson, Law and Finance at 618. He
overlooks the fact, however, that control blocks offer a greater reduction in agency costs to
the controlling shareholders. See note 83 and accompanying text. This, coupled with an
ability to resell the control block at a premium, can provide adequate incentives to form a
control block without favoring a rule that allows self-dealing by the controlling shareholder.
Note, however, that none of this justifies allowing premium control sales where the con-
trol block was not formed out of dispersed shareholdings. No incentive to create control
blocks is needed in such cases. The line of analysis in this footnote thus has little applica-
tion in the typical case where the control block existed from the time of the corporation's
founding.
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rence associated with the two rules. 132 If most control transfers en-
hance corporate value, then underdeterrence is relatively less
important and overdeterrence is comparatively more important.
Under these circumstances, the disadvantages of the equal sharing
approach and the advantages of the deregulatory approach loom
larger, while the advantages of the equal sharing approach and the
disadvantages of the deregulatory approach seem less serious. If
most control transfers harm corporations, then the advantages and
disadvantages counsel in the opposite dirbction.
Collecting the necessary empirical data is, however, problem-
atic. A particularly difficult problem is that the present frequency
of harmful and beneficial transfers may simply reflect current doc-
trine. For example, a recent study shows that the stock market
price of minority shares generally increases when a majority con-
trol block is sold.3 3 Ronald Gilson, Bernard Black and Larry Rib-
stein have all suggested that this study supports the deregulatory
approach over the equal sharing approach.134 And the ALI relies on
the same study to propose a significant relaxation of fiduciary du-
ties in sale of control cases.3 5 But the reason the minority shares
generally benefit from the majority block sale may be that curient
doctrine often imposes an equal sharing requirement. Indeed, if
the doctrine is functioning properly, we would expect that the sales
of control that presently get completed are generally beneficial be-
cause most of the harmful ones have been screened out. A cur-
rently high frequency of beneficial control transfers does not mean
that control transfers would generally be beneficial if a deregu-
latory approach were implemented.
In any event, focusing on empirical data concerning the gen-
eral frequency of beneficial and harmful control transfers may not
be relevant. The legal regime need not simply accept the general
case mix presented to it. With a preliminary sorting, it can segre-
gate cases into two classes-one where the control transfers are
.2 See text accompanying note 108.
133 See Clifford G. Holderness and Dennis P. Sheehan, The Role of Majority Share-
holders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis, 20 J Fin Econ 317 (1988).
Another limitation on the Holderness and Sheehan study is that, given its sample, it does
not demonstrate that noncontrolling shareholders tend to gain from sales of control when
the control blocks are not more than 50% of the shares. The profitability, and thus risk, of
control abuse increases the smaller the control block, and we might thus expect the results
to be different if nonmajority control blocks were included in the sample.
13" See Gilson and Black, Law and Finance at 137-39 (cited in note 58); Ribstein, Busi-
ness Associations at 1004 (cited in note 80).
"I See ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance § 5.16 comment c and reporter's note
1 (cited in note 25).
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mainly beneficial, and another where the control transfers are
mainly harmful-and then apply a different rule to each class of
cases. All that is needed is a doctrine that can roughly sort control
transfers based on the likelihood that they will benefit or harm the
corporation, and then trigger the appropriate rule.
It is important to stress that such a doctrinal trigger does not
turn on whether the control buyer actually abused control. Control
can be abused with or without a transfer, and the difficulties of
assessing when control is abused are precisely what justifies some
screening at the control transfer level.136 In assessing whether the
control transfer, rather than the eventual exercise of control,
seems likely to be beneficial or harmful to the corporation, the key
question is whether or not the transfer significantly increases the
risk that control abuses would occur. That risk may increase for a
variety of reasons. The control buyer may be prone to looting. The
circumstances of the purchase may suggest an enhanced incentive
to abuse control. Or the control transfer may, in particular cases,
lessen the effectiveness of the laws regulating control abuses. All of
these increased risks, as we will see in Part IV, play an important
role in current sale of control doctrine.
By the same token, the trigger need not, and indeed should
not, turn on whether actual harm ultimately results to the corpo-
ration from the control transfer. That is an ex post issue, and re-
flects both stochastic factors and some behavior (legal and illegal)
solely within the control of the control buyer. The issue here is an
ex ante one: whether the control transfer, at the time it was made,
seemed to increase significantly the risk of control abuses. The ac-
tion of transferring control is, after all, the only behavior that sale
of control doctrine can affect.
Moreover, the whole point of having a doctrinal trigger that
sorts cases into two different types of categorical rules, each of
which has different under- and overinclusions, is to avoid case-by-
case assessments of the ultimate issue. The equal sharing rule is
invoked not because it constitutes the best means of assessing
whether the control transfer was value-enhancing, but because the
incentive structure prevailing under the equal sharing rule tends to
screen out unproductive transfers without requiring difficult case-
by-case assessments. This incentive structure may hinder produc-
tive transfers too frequently to apply the equal sharing approach
across the board. But in those cases where a rough initial sorting
" See page 1448 (noting that, especially when control abuses are subtle, they are hard
to distinguish from desirable activities).
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can determine that the mix of cases includes many non-productive
transfers, the equal sharing rule may do a better job of screening
out those non-productive transfers than case-by-case assessments
ever could.
In short, the foregoing analysis suggests that the over- and un-
derdeterrence of control transfers can better be optimized by using
a doctrine that triggers different rules in different sets of circum-
stances. Where the circumstances suggest the risk of control abuse
has significantly increased, the equal sharing rule would apply.
Where no such special circumstances exist, the deregulatory ap-
proach would apply.
Of course, like any doctrine, a triggering doctrine is itself sub-
ject to the danger of judicial misevaluation. Courts may have false
positives-imposing the sharing obligation where the control trans-
fers did not significantly increase the risk of abuse-or false nega-
tives-failing to impose the sharing obligation on transfers that
did. This might suggest to some that a triggering approach will not
in fact improve the optimization of over- and underdeterrence. But
this is to apply an unrealistic standard. A triggering doctrine, like
any other doctrine, cannot eliminate the overdeterrence of good
behavior and underdeterrence of bad behavior-it can only opti-
mize the overall behavioral effects.
In this connection, it is important that where an error in ap-
plying the triggering doctrine is made, the control transfer will not
be over- or underdeterred unless it is also over- or underdeterred
by the triggered rule. Suppose, for example, the risk of false posi-
tives makes some control sellers unwilling to make premium con-
trol sales. Such a control seller should, in many cases, still be will-
ing to agree to a control sale structured to give controlling and
noncontrolling shareholders the same price.137 Indeed, for all the
reasons set forth in Section II.B, the control sale should generally
be undeterred if it is beneficial. Thus, overdeterrence will only
happen if the control transfer is of the sort both that the control
seller thinks will seem fishy to a court and that is overdeterred by
the equal sharing approach. Some overdeterrence will surely occur,
but it seems likely that, where the control seller believes the trans-
action looks risk-increasing, even more underdeterrence will be
avoided.
117 A common response to the threat of litigation is in fact making the offer open to all
shareholders even when not strictly required. See Berle, 58 Colum L Rev at 1222 (cited in
note 61); Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 280 (cited in note 3); Hill, 70 Harv L Rev
at 987, 1038 (cited in note 7).
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The triggering doctrine thus need not sort perfectly. It can be
successful as long as it roughly sorts cases into the groups that are
best dealt with by the equal sharing and deregulatory ap-
proaches.3 8 That, I argue next, is precisely what current doctrine
does.
IV. THE TRIGGERING FUNCTION OF CURRENT DOCTRINE
It had been clear for decades that the law rejects both a gen-
eral duty to share and a universal deregulation of sharing in sale of
control cases. The question remains what the law stands for. As I
argued in Part I, various parts of the doctrine seem vague and con-
clusory. I argue here, however, that the results reached in the cases
can best be explained in terms of the triggering function described
in Part III.13
For current doctrine to fulfill this triggering function, it must
trigger the equal sharing approach where underdeterrence of harm-
ful transfers is especially worrisome: that is, where the circum-
stances suggest that the transfer has made the risk of control abuse
higher or harder to police. It does this with the various exceptions,
described in Part I, to the general rule allowing unshared premium
control sales. What suffices for "reasonable suspicion" that the
buyer will loot, which office transfers are deemed "sales of offices,"
and when the opportunity diverted by a sale of control is "corpo-
"I Of course, even if the triggering doctrine succeeds in better optimizing control trans-
fers than the equal sharing or deregulatory approaches, it may still be undesirable if this
behavioral improvement is outweighed by the increased procedural costs of the triggering
approach. Two points should, however, be noted on this score. First, very few sale of control
cases are actually litigated under the current doctrine. Second, an important reason for this
is that sellers often avoid these procedural costs by complying with the equal sharing rule.
See note 137. It thus probably makes more sense to adjust for procedural costs by requiring
somewhat more proof to trigger the equal sharing rule than the behavioral tradeoff would
otherwise suggest. Current doctrine arguably does just that by making the deregulatory ap-
proach the presumptive rule.
"I The descriptive thesis laid out here in Part IV is logically independent from the
normative thesis laid out in Part III. One might believe that using a two-rule triggering
approach would in fact better optimize behavior, but be unconvinced that current doctrine
actually accomplishes this. Readers reaching that conclusion should approve of reforming
the doctrine to make it perform the triggering function I describe. Or, conversely, one might
be unconvinced that a two-rule triggering approach does further behavioral optimization,
but still agree that such a policy framework best explains current sale of control doctrine.
Those reaching this conclusion should still agree that the triggering function rationale helps
explain the results the courts reach and thus provides useful guidance to litigators and cor-
porate planners.
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rate" or "collective," all generally turn on whether or not the con-
trol transfer seems likely to increase significantly the risk of con-
trol abuse. Moreover, triggering analysis allows one to see that the
disparate measures of damages under the different excep-
tions-ranging from consequential damages to the entire premium
to the unshared portion-actually form an integrated schedule of
remedies that corresponds to the likelihood that violations of the
equal sharing rule will be detected and that desirable transfers
might be overdeterred.
Where there are no special circumstances suggesting a signifi-
cantly increased risk of control abuse, the concern about un-
derdeterring harmful transfers lessens, and the concern about
overdeterring beneficial transfers increases. In those circumstances,
the doctrine must instead trigger the deregulatory approach, which
it does with the general rule that applies when none of the excep-
tions has been met. The following sections explain how the case
law fits this triggering function.
A. Explaining Sale to Suspected Looters Cases
The line of looting cases is both the easiest and the hardest to
explain in terms of its triggering function. It is the easiest because
the courts' concern with the increased risk of corporate harm is so
apparent. Moreover, the courts' willingness to impose a duty to in-
vestigate on the control seller, rather than just relying on the legal
enforcement of the buyer's fiduciary obligations, suggests judicial
awareness of the inability of ordinary fiduciary duties to eliminate
underdeterrence.
Note in particular that current doctrine cannot be explained
solely on the ground that the control seller is the lower cost inves-
tigator. For if an investigation fails to dispel suspicions that the
control buyer will loot, the control seller cannot avoid liability by
disclosing the investigatory results to the noncontrolling share-
holders, and then selling anyway. Such a course of action would
impose on the noncontrolling shareholders the costs of monitoring
and litigating transaction by transaction to prevent looting. This
the noncontrolling shareholders would be poorly positioned to do
because of their small stakes, collective action problems, and lack
of timely access to information about corporate operations. The
underdeterrence caused by allowing control sales to known or sus-
pected looters would accordingly be high, and the doctrine impos-
ing liability on control sellers who sell to them can best be ex-
plained as a prophylactic measure intended to prevent this
underdeterrence from being exploited.
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But the looting cases are also the hardest to explain in terms
of the doctrine's triggering function because of an apparent reme-
dial mismatch. The penalty for making an unshared premium con-
trol sale to a suspected looter is not just damages equal to the un-
shared portions of the premium, but can include the entire
premium and compensation for any damage done to the corpora-
tion by the control buyer.14 0 But this is not as anomalous as it
might appear. If, in a particular class of cases, one wants to require
control sellers to share the opportunity to sell at a premium, a pen-
alty that imposed no sanction other than sharing the control pre-
mium would significantly underdeter refusals to share. Sellers
could simply sell without sharing, figuring that their violation will
often not be detected or punished, and that, when it is, the dam-
ages will leave them no worse off than if they had complied from
the beginning with the sharing requirement.
Detection will be far below one hundred percent because the
other shareholders may not know the seller had reason to suspect
the buyers of being looters. The seller may well, after all, control
most of the information regarding his suspicions.14 1 Moreover, even
if such information would be available in discovery, the other
shareholders are unlikely to initiate suit unless they have reason to
believe, before discovery, that the seller had grounds for suspicion.
To be sure, if actual looting occurs, it may alert the noncontrolling
shareholders to look into the control sale. But one must remember
that often the control seller will have reasonable suspicions about a
control buyer who turns out not to loot. Making an unshared pre-
mium control sale to such a suspicious (though ultimately harm-
less) buyer also violates sale of control doctrine, but is far harder
to detect.
Given the imperfect detection of sales to suspected looters, a
penalty requiring only sharing would impose an expected penalty
insufficient to induce sharing. 42 Moreover, unless the law exacts a
40 See Leech, 104 U Pa L Rev at 780, 783 (cited in note 10); Comment, 31 U Chi L Rev
at 740 & nn 68, 70 (cited in note 130) (collecting cases).
"" See Bundy and Elhauge, 79 Cal L Rev at 324, 338-41 (cited in note 113) (noting that
the information reaching the tribunal can be skewed in such circumstances).
142 In addition to being discounted for the chances of nondetection, the expected pen-
alty must be discounted because settlements will generally result in recoveries lower than
the full penalty. Because the gain to the plaintiff from winning a lawsuit equals the damages
minus the litigation expenses, even a plaintiff with a 100% chance of winning will have an
incentive to settle for an amount less than those damages. The discount will be even greater
if there is some uncertainty about victory. See generally Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolutions, 27 J Econ Lit
1067, 1071-80 (1989) (describing factors affecting settlements).
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penalty greater than the sharing of the control premium, the con-
trol seller will enjoy the benefits of selling control without suffering
the risk that the buyer will loot the corporation. Because such a
regime would give a control seller inadequate incentives to investi-
gate the buyer, the actual penalty imposed on violators must be
increased. This is, in essence, what the rule about damages in loot-
ing cases does.
Another apparent remedial mismatch is that, even if all the
shareholders do get to share in the premium control sale, the origi-
nal. controlling shareholder might still be liable for permitting a
control sale to a suspected looter.143 It might accordingly appear
that the cases concerning sales of control to looters are simply a
special application of the general duty of care. 44 This appearance
is, however, deceiving. The decisionmaking of control sellers in the
looting cases is subjected to far tighter scrutiny than it would re-
ceive in a typical duty of care case. If all the shareholders were
able to participate in the sale of a control block, so that the initial
controlling shareholder experienced the same benefits and risks
from the sale as the other shareholders, the decision to sell the
particular buyer a control block would ordinarily receive the pro-
tection of the business judgment rule. 45 There is, after all, no rea-
son for such a decision to receive greater scrutiny than, say, a con-
trolling shareholder's decision to approve a corporate loan to
someone who turns out to be uncreditworthy. The review is not
nearly so deferential when the control seller alone receives the ben-
efits of the premium and avoids the risk of the control transfer. 46
It would thus be more accurate to say that an obligation to
share a premium control sale is triggered by circumstances sug-
gesting looting, but that the penalty for violating this obligation
may (for deterrence reasons) include consequential damages. Be-
cause these damages are the same as those imposed for a duty of
care violation, it is easy to mistakenly conflate the two causes of
action. But the gross negligence or recklessness that must be
143 See Hazen, 125 U Pa L Rev at 1026 (cited in note 3). See also Javaras, 32 U Chi L
Rev at 423-25 (cited in note 81) (arguing that control sellers who comply with the equal
sharing rule should still be liable if they negligently sell to suspected looters); Comment, 31
U Chi L Rev at 740 (cited in note 130) (same for control sellers who receive no premium).
144 See Brudney, 65 Mich L Rev at 295 (cited in note 65).
146 See Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 550-54 (cited in note 1) (assuming sharing opportu-
nity to sell at a premium would eliminate liability for selling to suspected looter).
,4" See also Brudney, 65 Mich L Rev at 296 (cited in note 65) (concluding that "more
than the duty of care or of exercising sound business judgment is involved" when a control-
ling shareholder sells at a premium to a suspected looter).
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proven to make out a violation of the duty of care (especially
under the protection of the business judgment rule) differs mark-
edly from the proof needed in the cases involving premium control
sales to suspected looters. This understanding of the looting cases
seems confirmed by the fact that, where no looting in fact occurs,
but the controlling shareholder made an unshared premium con-
trol sale despite circumstances suggesting looting, the control seller
can be found liable.14
7
We can now apply this understanding to explain or resolve
some of the outstanding doctrinal issues in the sale-to-looters line
of cases. One issue is whether the duty to investigate should be
affirmative or conditional on suspicious circumstances. As dis-
cussed above, the bulk of the courts have concluded that the duty
is only conditional, even though it would seem the control seller
would also have an advantage in investigating ostensibly benign
control buyers. 148 This comports with this Article's analysis be-
cause the aim of the doctrine is not to stop looting, but to mini-
mize total over- and underdeterrence. An affirmative duty would
increase overdeterrence of desirable control transfers by imposing
the costs of investigation on all control transfers.
Perhaps more significantly, an affirmative duty to investigate
would mean that all control sellers would face a risk of liability for
insufficient investigation. Because the defense that the investiga-
tion conducted was sufficiently thorough will offer less certain pro-
tection1 49 than the defense (under the conditional rule) that no
suspicious circumstances were known to the seller, the risk of erro-
neous liability would be higher. 50 Given the relatively high penal-
ties described above (liability for the entire control premium and
consequential damages), this risk of erroneous liability could be ex-
147 See Leech, 104 U Pa L Rev at 789-90, 797 (cited in note 10); O'Neal, 38 U Pitt L
Rev at 18 (cited in note 4). In its comments to § 5.16, the ALI has proposed a change to this
rule. See ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance § 5.16 comment e at 509-10 (cited in
note 25). But this change was not included in § 5.16 itself, making it unclear whether the
ALI appreciated the significance of this proposal, which would in effect require noncontrol-
ling shareholders to prove a breach of fiduciary duty by the control buyer before collecting
damages from the control seller, and would thus overturn not only the looting rule cited in
the text but also Perlman and Ahmanson.
18 See text accompanying notes 5-8.
19 This uncertainty is particularly high since there is so far no case that has decided
how thorough the investigation must be. See Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 265
(cited in note 3).
150 Moreover, any thorough investigation may be likely to turn up something that could
be seized upon, after the looting occurs, to claim that a reasonable suspicion should have
barred the sale. A claim limited to those facts known to the seller without investigation
would be much harder to make.
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pected to cause many sellers to sell control only under the equal
sharing rule. The overdeterrence of desirable control transfers
would rise accordingly. Penalties could be reduced, but only at the
cost of worsening underdeterrence in all cases, including where the
reasons to suspect the control buyer are obvious. It is thus advisa-
ble to draw the rule somewhat more narrowly, but keep the pen-
alty for non-sharing high. This is in essence what the bulk of the
courts have done by imposing the duty only where the circum-
stances known to the seller raise a reasonable suspicion.
Another unsettled issue under current doctrine is what should
be considered sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion. 151 The
answer, under triggering function theory, is that a reasonable sus-
picion should be found whenever the characteristics concerning the
control buyer suggest that the control transfer will substantially
increase the risk of control abuse. This may not seem like much of
an advance: determining what constitutes a substantial increase in
the risk of control abuse may be just as difficult as determining
what constitutes a reasonable suspicion. But it seems likely that, in
the areas of inevitable doctrinal ambiguity, some guidance will be
provided by a better understanding of the policy underpinnings of
the doctrine. Courts can, for example, focus more directly on the
question whether the screening benefits of their chosen standard
offset its overdeterrence costs on desirable transfers,
Understanding the true basis for the doctrine also helps better
explain the case results. In particular, it helps explain why some
circumstances, not so suspicious,, have been deemed sufficient to
impose liability. The circumstances that courts have held sufficient
to warn control sellers of impending looting include: (1) unsatisfied
judgments against, and bankruptcy filings by, the control buyer;
and (2) a high price coupled with the buyer's insistence on imme-
diate control over liquid assets. 152 Now these circumstances are far
from innocuous. But it seems a bit of a stretch to say that such
circumstances should have alerted the control seller that the con-
trol buyer "was likely to loot the corporation.' ' 153 No stretch is re-
quired, however, once one realizes that the underlying question is
really whether the control transfer has substantially increased the
risk of control abuse, for even if one could not say looting was ac-
See text accompanying note 9.
See Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 264 (cited in note 3) (collecting cases).
"' DeBaun v First Western Bank & Trust Co., 46 Cal App 3d 686, 120 Cal Rptr 354,
360 (1975).
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tually likely, the risk certainly seemed higher under the above
circumstances.
Nonetheless, it seems clear that, however explained, the ex-
ception for sales to suspected looters remains ambiguous. One
might thus justifiably be concerned that this ambiguity will
overdeter beneficial control transfers.154 But note that the explana-
tion pressed here substantially lessens the overdeterrence concern
because the triggered duty requires only that the seller share the
sale opportunity. The seller concerned about mistakenly being
found liable for selling to a suspected looter can thus always mini-
mize his liability exposure by structuring the sale to include all
shareholders.15 5 The triggered duty will overdeter beneficial trans-
fers only when the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious that a
cautious seller will share the control sale and the equal sharing
rule would prevent a beneficial transfer from going through. 156 The
analysis does, however, suggest that the courts should make clear
that the level of scrutiny exhibited in the looting cases applies only
where the seller has failed to share the control sale opportunity.
A final issue is whether payment of a control premium should
alone suffice to raise a reasonable suspicion. 57 Except in certain
circumstances, the answer is no. Although payment of a control
premium certainly reflects the buyer's belief that he can profit
from control, legitimate or illegitimate uses of control can produce
profits. And the existence of some control premium is implicit in
the fact that controlling shares suffer a lower agency cost discount
than other shares. 58 The control buyer should thus be willing to
pay a control premium even if she has no plan for deriving greater
profits (legitimate or illegitimate) from the control block than the
control seller did.5 9 Nor is the size of the premium determinative.
154 See Gilson, Law and Finance at 621-22 (cited in note 3) (expressing this concern);
Note, 58 Neb L Rev at 908 (cited in note 9) (same).
'5 True, the seller who does so might still be held liable, but only under far milder
duty of care scrutiny. See text accompanying notes 143-47.
"I$ Although such overdeterrence cannot be eliminated, it would seem that when the
circumstances are sufficiently suspicious that the seller fears a court finding that she had
reason to believe the seller would loot, then overdeterrence may be less of a concern than
underdeterrence. And that, of course, is precisely the sort of situation for which the equal
sharing rule is well suited.
'1 See text accompanying note 10.
158 See text accompanying note 83.
159 The control buyer must of course value those profits more than the control seller for
the transaction to go forth, but such a difference in valuation may happen for a variety of
reasons unrelated to changes in corporate profitability. The seller may, for example, have
greater need of liquidity, more aversion to risk, or a lower willingness to exert the personal
effort of monitoring or managing corporate activities that is necessary to make controlling
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While a looter can often profit despite paying an excessive pre-
mium, it is not clear why we should think that looters are willing
to pay premiums any higher than prevailing market premiums: the
excess premium just raises suspicions and cuts into their profits.16 0
Moreover, a looter would seem to have no special reason to buy
control over a particular corporation. Looters are not looking for
special synergies; they can search for the cheapest opportunity to
buy control over a lootable corporation.
Indeed, generally the bigger the premium paid, the less likely
that looting will seem attractive to the control buyer. For example,
suppose a corporation with assets of $100 million and no liabilities
has one million shares outstanding which trade on the market at
$100/share. Buyer A proposes to buy sixty percent control at a
twenty-five percent premium; i.e., 600,000 shares at $125/share for
a total of $75 million. Buyer B proposes to buy sixty percent con-
trol at an eighty percent premium; i.e., 600,000 shares at $180/
share for a total of $108 million. Buyer A could, in theory, profit by
$25 million by looting all the corporation's assets. Buyer B, on the
other hand, will lose $8 million if his only plan is to loot the corpo-
ration. Buyer B must thus have some plan for increasing the value
or profitability of the corporate assets. Similarly, the bigger the
control block sold, the more any buyer who plans to loot will be
looting himself. Thus, at least for substantial control blocks, the
payment of a high premium makes it less plausible that the control
buyer plans to use control to loot the equity of voting shareholders.
This is not to deny that the payer of a large control premium
might sometimes be able to profit by paying more than the value
of shareholder equity and then looting so extensively that he not
only exhausts the equity of common stock shareholders but also
appropriates corporate assets to which others have a superior
claim.16' To illustrate, suppose that in the above example the cor-
shares more valuable than other shares. Any of these differences, which may be created by
other investment decisions, would make the control block more valuable to the buyer even if
he planned to derive the same legitimate corporate profits as the seller.
"I0 See Javaras, 32 U Chi L Rev at 424 & n 17 (cited in note 81); Comment, 31 U Chi L
Rev at 739-40 (cited in note 130). Of course, the existence of liability for sale to suspected
looters will mean that suspected looters will have to pay higher premiums to compensate
sellers for the risk of liability. See Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 267 (cited in
note 3) (arguing that the control buyer may pay a high premium to persuade the seller not
to run a credit check). But these higher premiums follow from the risk of liability itself; to
impose a risk of liability whenever a high premium was paid would mean that every pre-
mium would be inflated, whether or not other suspicious circumstances existed.
11 Special concerns are raised by corporations that are investment companies, where
corporate control extends not only over corporate assets but over investment instruments
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poration had $200 million in corporate assets and $100 million in
corporate debt. 62 Then both Buyer A and Buyer B could profit by
looting all $200 million in corporate assets.' But if our concern is
about looting beyond shareholder equity, the equal sharing rule is
a less effective screen, for a buyer who complies with the equal
sharing rule by purchasing one hundred percent of a corporation's
common stock can still profit from such looting.
Moreover, even though paying a high premium does not make
looting the stake of other investors impossible, it remains the case
that, all other things being equal, a higher premium means such
looting is less profitable, and thus usually less likely. Buyer B
would make less of a profit from looting than Buyer A and is there-
fore more likely to be deterred by the legal penalties for looting. A
higher premium also makes it more likely that the premium will
exceed the lootable amount, making looting unprofitable even if
one ignores expected legal penalties. Of course, there may be some
cases where the lootable amount exceeds the premium but the pre-
mium is so high that it is implausible that the control buyer plans
to profit in a legitimate fashion. But absent such a special showing,
a high premium should not generally be regarded as evidence suffi-
cient to trigger the equal sharing rule.6
being held for corporate clients. An incorporated brokerage firm, for example, might hold
only a few million in corporate assets, but many millions in securities for its customers. A
serious risk thus exists that a control buyer might pay more than the value of the corporate
assets, but yet profit by looting the investments held by the corporation. This explains why
the early cases that relied heavily on the size of the premium generally involved investment
companies. See Gerdes v Reynolds, 28 NYS2d 622 (Sup Ct 1941); Insuranshares Corp. of
Delaware v Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F Supp 22 (E D Pa 1940). The concerns raised by
investment company sales of control are sufficiently severe to require special regulation,
which is now provided by the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 USC §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64
(1988).
161 A similar problem would be posed if the corporation had $200 million in assets and
outstanding preferred stock worth $100 million, but control was purchased only over the
common stock.
163 A control buyer can also profit from extensive looting despite paying a large pre-
mium if much of the purchase price is borrowed. See, for example, DeBaun v First Western
Bank & Trust Co., 46 Cal App 3d 686, 120 Cal Rptr 354 (1975). Accordingly, the financing
of the purchase of control is thus sometimes regarded as a factor supporting reasonable
suspicion. But note that here the person best situated to protect against the risk of buyer
looting is usually the buyer's lender unless the control seller knows suspicious facts about
the buyer that the lender does not.
164 See ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance § 5.16 comment e (cited in note 25)
(agreeing with this conclusion).
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B. Explaining Sale of Office Cases
Understanding the triggering function of sale of control doc-
trine also helps make sense of the doctrine's sale of office cases. As
we saw in Section I.B., these cases cannot be explained in terms of
whether or not a payment was actually made for the transfer of
offices, because in fact part of the premium must always reflect
payment for the immediate office transfer. This is true whether the
control block transferred constitutes three, ten, thirty, sixty, or
even ninety percent of the corporation's stock.
The doctrine makes more sense, however, if understood as ap-
plying the sale of office label, and thus imposing the equal sharing
duty, whenever the control transfer seems likely to increase the
risk of control abuse. The greater the investment interest of the
buyer, the less likely that he will want to place people who will
harm the corporation into corporate offices, and the less benefit to
the equal sharing approach. The smaller the investment interest of
the control buyer, the more likely it is that abusing control will be
profitable, and thus the more advantageous the equal sharing ap-
proach will be.
This helps illuminate the choice between the bright-line and
working control tests. The aims of economizing on procedural costs
or protecting shareholder democracy, I argued in Section I.B., do
not offer a persuasive explanation for favoring the bright-line
(greater than fifty percent) test. Judge Friendly's bright-line test
is, however, explicable in terms of his apparent view that many
premium control transfers are harmful.165 If this view is accurate,
then underdeterrence is a greater concern and, at the margin, the
range of cases covered by the equal sharing test should be ex-
panded. Judge Lumbard's adoption of the working control test, in
contrast, was based on the view that most premium control trans-
fers are beneficial and should not be hindered.'66 This latter view,
which has come to dominate the doctrine generally, suggests a
greater (though not all-encompassing) role for the deregulatory
rule.
Note also that the working control test effectively makes the
sale of office exception complementary to the other exceptions to
the general rule permitting unshared premium control sales. If the
transaction involves a sale of working control, the exceptions for
See Essex Universal Corp. v Yates, 305 F2d 572, 581 (2d Cir 1962) (Friendly con-
curring) ("in this Court we have seen many cases where sudden shifts of corporate control
have caused serious injury").
166 See id at 578-79 (Lumbard).
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selling control to suspected looters and for control sales that divert
corporate/collective opportunities are potentially applicable. If no
working control is involved, these exceptions are not applicable,
16 7
but any office transfer is subject to sale of office liability unless the
premium stock sale is shared. This makes sense. Where the stock
percentage sold is high, the control buyer shares more of an inter-
est with the other shareholders, and more particularized evidence
that the control transfer will increase the risk of control abuse
seems desirable, which is just what the sale to looters and corpo-
rate/collective opportunity exceptions require. Where the stock
percentage is low, the fear of control abuse is justifiably higher,
and any office transfer should be subject to the selective screening
of the equal sharing test.'
The underlying triggering policy does not, unfortunately, pro-
vide any precise answer to the question of what percentage of stock
should suffice to constitute "working control" that immunizes the
agreement from sale of office liability. It does, however, explain
why courts have been unwilling to rely on evidence that would
seem to establish actual working control, such as the control
seller's ability to arrange the transfer of offices, or whether the
given block sufficed to control the board in the past.' Because
courts are concerned about the incentive to abuse control provided
by low percentage stockholdings and immediate control over cor-
porate offices,170 the fact that actual working control exists is not
determinative. What is relevant is whether the new controlling
shareholder has the incentives created by low stockholdings, and
the ability created by immediate control over corporate offices, to
make the transfer raise a high risk of control abuse.
The connection between low percentages and the risk of con-
trol abuses is most clear if we have precisely the sort of transaction
that proponents of the deregulatory school fear will be most de-
terred by the equal sharing rule: a transaction that will go forth
only if the premium is divided unequally.1 71 In such cases, the ex-
167 See Treadway Companies, Inc. v Care Corp., 638 F2d 357, 376-77 (2d Cir 1980)
(holding that seller of 14% block was not liable on the ground that he did not in fact have
control).
'8 Where the percentage is low and no offices are transferred, then the buyer of the
shares will not actually gain control, and there is no reason to trigger the equal sharing duty.
"I See text accompanying notes 26-27.
10 Note that the incentive to abuse control might simply take the form of excessive
salaries paid for corporate offices. Where the controlling shareholders do not hold corporate
offices, they are more likely to exercise their control to restrain agency abuses by
management.
171 See text accompanying notes 93-94.
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isting holder of control must be deriving some value from her
shares that the other shareholders are not deriving from theirs.17 2
A control buyer might then be able to increase. corporate profits by
eliminating this extra-shareholder relation. But the lower the per-
centage the control buyer owns, the more this profit will have to be
shared with the other shareholders. The profits from value-en-
hancements will thus have to be very high to exceed the profits
from abusing control in the same manner as (or more effectively
than) the original controlling shareholder did.17 The very control
transfer most deterred by the equal sharing rule thus seems more
likely to be negative than positive when the percentage of stock
purchased is low.
Of course, the ambiguity in ascertaining the acceptable per-
centage of stock remains considerable. One can thus expect consid-
erable penumbral deterrence, where transactors will feel obligated
to offer control sales to all shareholders to avoid the risk of mis-
taken liability. But, again, this will overdeter desirable control
transfers only where the transfer also fits within the range of cases
overdeterred by the equal sharing approach. 74 For many cases,
this approach will mean that, because the control seller who shares
the sale has the right incentives to evaluate the risks posed by the
control buyer, the transaction will go through if it is beneficial.
It is also worth noting that, in contrast to the sales to looters
cases, the sale of office cases impose liability for the entire control
premium, but not for consequential damages. This makes sense be-
cause the underdetection problems are less severe in such cases
than in sales to suspected looters: the key information, the per-
centage of stock sold and the transfer of offices, is generally public
information. 7 5 Cases such as Perlman and Ahmanson, which I will
return to in the next Section, involve actions that are both public
"I See Gilson, Law and Finance at 617-19 (cited in note 3). Note that the excess value
could not, for example, come from the simple fact that the controlling shareholder suffers
lower agency costs than the others because that would not explain why the average value of
all the shares to the control buyer is lower than the per share value of the controlling shares
to the original holder of control.
173 See Hamilton, 36 Case Western Res L Rev at 256-57 (cited in note 3).
174 And, again, courts could substantially lessen overdeterrence by making clear that,
where the control premium has been shared pro rata, separate liability for transferring of-
fices does not apply. See, for example, Nelson v Gammon, 478 F Supp 630, 637 (W D Ky
1979) (no sale of office liability when minority shareholders received same price as control-
ling shareholders).
1275 SEC regulations require buyers of control over registered public corporations to no-
tify noncontrolling shareholders of the control transfer. See Loss and Seligman, Securities
Regulation 1692-93 <cited in note 27). No such specific notice requirement applies to close
corporations (though it would seem one should and that fiduciary duties may sometimes
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and borderline in terms of increasing the risk of control abuse. The
concern about overdeterrence is sufficiently great in such cases
that sharing the control premium is the only liability imposed. 17
The final issue is whether a premium exceeding the price the
control shares would alone command should itself be deemed de-
terminative. As we saw, an affirmative answer to this question
would effectively mean that all agreements to transfer offices were
sales of offices, since they always have some economic value. 177
This does not, however, provide a complete explanation for the
courts' general tendency to answer this question negatively; one
could instead conclude that all agreements to transfer offices
should be illegal.
The analysis in Parts II and III offers a more telling reason:
much of the value of controlling shares rests precisely on the fact
that controlling shareholders suffer from lower agency costs than
other shareholders. 78 This value would be lost if the board were
not under the controlling shareholder's authority. A refusal to al-
low agreements to transfer offices could thus be expected to create
a divergence between the price a control seller would take (which
will reflect lower agency costs) and the price a control buyer will
pay (which will not). Overdeterrence would suffer a substantial in-
crease. Moreover, where sales of control are completed without of-
fice transfers, agency costs for all shareholders would increase be-
cause management has less commonality of interest with the
shareholders than the controlling shareholder does.
C. Explaining Diverted Opportunity Cases
Triggering function theory is most useful in explaining the
cases most difficult to explain (or cabin) under the current doc-
trine: the diverted opportunity cases. As elsewhere, the formal la-
bels applied by the courts reflect policy conclusions. The courts are
more likely to label an opportunity "corporate" or "collective," or
to conclude that it was "diverted" by the sale of control, if the
control transfer appears to increase the risk of control abuse.
Where no such increased risk is posed, opportunities that might
otherwise appear similar are labelled differently, and the equal
sharing approach is not triggered.
require such disclosure), but in any event the transfer of shares, and especially of offices, is
generally apparent in a close corporation.
178 See Perlman, 219 F2d at 178; Ahmanson, 460 P2d at 478.
177 See text accompanying notes 29-31.
18 See text accompanying note 83.
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1. Diverted business opportunities.
The Perlman exception is hard to explain under the current
doctrinal framework. 1 9 Although commentators cite the effective
diversion of a corporate business opportunity, no such diversion
was proved. And while the Perlman court cited the risk of a corpo-
rate business opportunity being diverted by the control buyer, that
does not explain the court's distinction between the sale of control
under its review and a sale of control to an interested customer.
Every sale of control, especially to an interested customer, poses
that risk. To be sure, post-transfer duty of loyalty claims can be
brought to curb control abuses by interested customers, but such
claims were also available against the control buyer in Perlman.
Thus, neither the risk that the buyer will divert corporate op-
portunities, nor the availability of other legal remedies to police
such diversions, can explain the distinction the court drew. Rather,
the distinction appears to be based on an implicit assessment of
the high degree of risk and relatively low feasibility of other legal
remedies in the circumstances at hand.
Where a market shortage is created by price controls, the re-
wards of diverting corporate products to a customer who is a con-
trolling shareholder are so great that they substantially increase
the risk that such diversions will occur. The circumstances also de-
crease the feasibility of legal remedies against the buyer because it
would be hard to win a suit alleging that it is unfair self-dealing for
the controlling shareholder to sell itself the corporate product at
the ethically fixed price. The obstacles to suit are both practical
and political. Practically, a plaintiff would have difficulty proving
that the corporation was- harmed by such transactions since the
product had to be sold at the ethically fixed price to someone. 80
Politically, a tribunal might be expected to react with revulsion to
'g See Section I.C.1.
160 See Perlman, 219 F2d at 179 (Swan dissenting) ("[T]here is nothing illegal in a
dominant shareholder purchasing from his own corporation at the same prices it offers to
other customers. That is what the [buyer] did, and there is no proof that [the corporation]
suffered any detriment therefrom."). Although proof of harm would be difficult, it would not
necessarily be impossible. Before the sale of control, the corporation was garnering some of
the scarcity value of its steel by securing interest-free advances from purchasers under what
was called the Feldmann Plan. Id at 177. If the buyer discontinued this plan by selling to
itself without the interest-free advances, that would suggest harm to the corporation. See
Andrews, 78 Harv L Rev at 510 (cited in note 1); Comment, 31 U Chi L Rev at 732-33 (cited
in note 130). But the plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence of harm to the corporation,
see Perlman, 129 F Supp 162, 176 (D Conn 1952), perhaps because, although a court would
likely be willing to allow a corporation to use interest-free loans to effectively evade ethical
price restraints, it is harder to imagine that a court would hold that the controlling share-
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the claim that the controlling shareholder had a duty to evade a
war time ethical restraint by selling to buyers who were willing to
offer valuable non-price inducements.18 In short, the facts in Perl-
man suggested that post-transfer control abuse was particularly
likely and hard to police under standard legal remedies. l 2
The incentives to self-deal and the feasibility of post-transfer
litigation are different for the typical sale to an interested cus-
tomer. Normally, a market price for the corporate product exists,
and the controlling shareholder cannot hope to reap a great profit
by selling the corporate product to itself without selling so far be-
low the market price that a self-dealing claim will be easy to prove
and win.
In sum, the court's holding reflected a judgment not that the
sale of control diverted or allowed the diversion of a corporate op-
portunity, nor a simple judgment that the control sale created the
risk of such a diversion, but rather a judgment that the control
transfer sufficiently increased the risk of control abuse that the
equal sharing obligation should have applied.""s And the distinc-
tion between an ordinary control sale to an interested customer
and such a sale during a period of price restrictions reflected a
powerful difference in the level of risk posed by the two
transactions.
That the transaction in Perlman did not actually decrease the
stock market price of noncontrolling shares is not the issue.'84 As
noted above, there are many problems with using stock market
prices;' s indeed, here the rise in the stock market price may have
holder had a duty to use such a scheme. That would require the court to hold that simply
selling at the ethical price was "unfair" and a violation of fiduciary duties.
181 See Levmore, 65 Tex L Rev at 1065 (cited in note 65).
182 Where the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that control abuse is likely and
hard to police, a seller who did not share the control premium must, to avoid liability, carry
the burden of showing that the diversion would not in fact occur. See Perlman, 219 F2d at
177.
183 Note that this helps settle what has been regarded as a perplexing issue: if the con-
trol seller is liable for the diverted opportunity, is the control buyer then free from liability?
See Ribstein, Business Associations at 999 question 1 (cited in note 80). The answer is no
because the liability of the seller and buyer are based on different grounds. The control
seller's liability, or rather duty to share the premium control sale, is grounded in a prophy-
lactic rule that does not turn on a corporate opportunity actually being diverted, just the
increased risk that it will be. The control buyer is liable only if he actually diverts a corpo-
rate opportunity, or otherwise abuses his control in violation of his fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty. Sometimes the seller will be liable but not the buyer, sometimes the buyer but
not the seller, sometimes both, and sometimes neither.
184 Compare Easterbrook and Fischel, 91 Yale L J at 717-18 (cited in note 2) (claiming
that it is the issue).
185 See text accompanying notes 104-06.
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reflected the shareholders' expectation that they would receive
part of the control premium in litigation. 8 More important, even
if the market price were an accurate measure of actual harm, that
would not matter. The duty to share the sale of control opportu-
nity is not imposed when harm ultimately does result, but when
the chances of harm are likely to be significantly increased by the
type of control transfer. Wrong need not have been done; the duty
is triggered for prophylactic purposes. It is fully expected that
many value-enhancing transactions will go through despite the im-
position of the sharing duty; in fact, the equal sharing approach is
largely premised on the argument that it will tend to allow such
beneficial transactions through its screen.
2. Converted offers.
The central issue concerning allegedly converted offers is
whether it should matter which offer the buyer makes first.18 7 Even
if the order of offers were substantively relevant, making liability
turn on the phrasing of the offer raises a serious practical problem:
the seller and buyer control most of the relevant information con-
cerning what was said. Since they have every incentive to utilize
that control to skew the information the tribunal learns about
their communications, adjudication about the issue will be rela-
tively unreliable. 88 Legal error, and thus the degree of over- and
underdeterrence, will be high. Moreover, if properly counseled,
buyers willing to purchase either a control block or the whole cor-
poration will know to discuss buying the control block first, so that
they can keep their options open.1 9
Further, to the extent how the offer was pitched is relevant, it
seems to cut in the opposite direction. Buyers who first make an
offer for all the corporation or all its shares have signalled a will-
ingness to purchase the entire corporation. This suggests not a
buyer planning to abuse control, but a buyer with benign motiva-
tions. 90 A buyer who offered to buy only the control block would
186 See Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.3 at 484-85 (cited in note 3).
187 See Section I.C.2.
188 See Bundy and Elhauge, 79 Cal L Rev at 324, 338-39 (cited in note 113).
189 See Jesse H. Choper, John C. Coffee, Jr., and C. Robert Morris, Jr., Cases and
Materials on Corporations 1064 (Little, Brown, 3d ed 1989). See also Elhauge and Bundy,
Knowledge about Legal Sanctions at 15-16 (cited in note 110) (noting that legal counseling
given prior to conduct can also be used to influence the information created about that
conduct).
10 This does not mean it would be wise to immunize a transaction from the sharing
requirement based on evidence that the control buyer first offered to, or was willing to,
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be more worrisome. It is thus not surprising that few cases have
actually followed Brown v Halbert's suggestion that unshared pre-
mium control sales cannot be made when the buyer first offers to
merge or purchase the corporation. 91
Also going nowhere is Brown v Halbert's suggestion that the
noncontrolling shareholders are entitled to have the seller take
steps to make the buyer's offer available to them.'92 The reason for
this may seem less evident. Such an entitlement need not be read
to impose a sharing requirement; it might be read to require only
that the seller make efforts to extend the offer. Thus interpreted,
it would allow the sale of a control block at a price unavailable to
the other shareholders if the buyer refused to pursue alterna-
tives. 93 Why not impose a requirement that effectively tests
whether or not the buyer would be willing instead to purchase all
the shares or to allow the original controlling shareholder to re-
main with a large stake? Wouldn't this simply impose a sharing
requirement unless the overdeterrence concerns about the equal
sharing test were verified?
An initial reason to reject this buyer-willingness test is that it
raises the same practical problem as liability that turns on how the
offer is pitched: the seller and buyer control the relevant informa-
tion.19 4 Making liability turn on the alternatives the buyer would
have been willing to pursue would also raise a serious conceptual
problem: at what price should the alternatives have bite? At the
price the buyer is willing to make available to all the shareholders,
the seller will likely be unwilling to sell. If the test means that the
controlling shareholder can never sell just the control block if the
buyer would be willing to buy one hundred percent of the stock (or
the corporation) at any price over the prevailing market price,
then the test does effectively impose the equal sharing approach in
all cases. If the test means that the controlling shareholder must
make available a buyer's offer to purchase all shares only if the
buyer is willing to pay the same price being paid to the controlling
purchase the entire corporation. For if that were the test, the control buyer and seller would
control, and could thus skew, the relevant information.
191 See Treadway Companies v Care Corp., 638 F2d 357, 375-77 (2d Cir 1980); Gilson,
Law and Finance at 622 (cited in note 3). See also ALl. Principles of Corporate Governance
§ 5.16 comment d and illus 3 (cited in note 25) (explicitly rejecting the duty to share the
control premium in such a case).
l See text accompanying note 49.
'" See generally Section II.C (explaining why a buyer might legitimately not wish to
buy either 100% of the corporation or a control block drawn proportionately from all
shareholders).
" See text accompanying notes 189-90.
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shareholder, then the test has no practical effect. And if the seller
must only make available "reasonable" buyer alternatives, then ad-
judication would be essentially unguided, and the resulting uncer-
tainty would increase the overdeterrence of desirable control
transfers.
3. Diverted collective opportunities.
The triggering function of sale of control doctrine is perhaps
most helpful in determining which "collective opportunities" be-
long to all the shareholders. As we saw above, Ahmanson's reason-
ing provides little guidance on this score. Without some under-
standing of the policy analysis underlying its conclusions,
Ahmanson teaches only that one particular opportunity-the op-
portunity to create a market for a corporation's shares-"belongs"
to all the shareholders. 195 What other opportunities belong to them
is an issue left open, corroding (without scrapping) the general
rule.
Triggering function theory provides the policy explanation
that can cabin Ahmanson and make sense of its distinction be-
tween ordinary control sales and the transaction it adjudicated.
Unlike ordinary control sales, the control transaction in Ahmanson
increased the risk of a particular abuse of control: namely, that
corporate control would be used to prevent a corporate stock split.
Before the control transaction, the risk of this particular control
abuse was low because all the shareholders would derive the same
benefits from a stock split. After the control transaction, however,
a stock split would undermine the majority's bargaining leverage
over the minority shareholders. 196
Not only was the risk increased, but, as in Perlman, the par-
ticular post-transfer control abuse in question was hard to police.
Courts have no rigorous or administrable standards for determin-
ing when a stock split should be executed. 197 Rather, courts defer
to the business judgment of corporate management. Indeed, the
"' See Section I.C.3.
190 The court's concern about this was express. See Ahmanson, 460 P2d at 476 (stating
that after the holding company was formed, "it became a virtual certainty that no
equivalent market could or would be created" for the savings and loan's stock because the
holding company that controlled the savings and loan would not benefit from it); id at 478
("Here the exchange was an integral part of a scheme that the defendants could reasonably
foresee would have as an incidental effect the destruction of the potential public market for
Association stock.").
'9 See Anacomp, Inc. v Wright, 449 NE2d 610, 617 (Ind App 1983); In re Estate of
Mellot, 1 Kan App 2d 709, 574 P2d 960, 969 (1977).
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Ahmanson court emphasized that it was not deciding, or even sug-
gesting, "that the duties of corporate fiduciaries include in all cases
an obligation to make a market for and to facilitate public trading
in the stock of the corporation."' 98 Given the difficulty of detecting
abuses of the power to prevent stock splits, it is easier to prevent
the incentive to abuse that power from arising in the first place.
Further, concerns about overdeterrence are weak here. Society
does not lose much by preventing corporations from being taken
partially public. There is no real risk that controllers will react by
refusing to take the whole corporation public: unlike with a sale of
control, it is hard to imagine occasions where an equal sharing rule
would prevent stock splitting from being profitable for all share-
holders. Splitting everyone's stock does not create control conflicts,
require financing, or depend on unequal divisions of the gain. 99
And while it is true that shareholders may have somewhat differ-
ent preferences about such transformations, these preferences can
always be accommodated by offering shareholders the opportunity
to opt out of the control transaction. 200 Given this weak overdeter-
rence, there seems little reason not to employ a legal rule that
reduces the temptation to abuse corporate power over stock splits.
The situation is different for the sort of recapitalization at is-
sue in Honigman. There was no reason in that case to believe the
control transaction would increase the risk of control abuses. The
financial effects of the recapitalization were purely distributional,
and the noncontrolling shareholders were the ones who took con-
trol. Moreover, the noncontrolling shareholders consented, as a
198 460 P2d at 476.
Compare problems cited in Section II.C. Note that the situation might be different
if, as some commentators have argued, the holding company in fact also involved other re-
lated financial institutions. See Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.3 at 490 (cited in note 3); Eas-
terbrook and Fischel, 91 Yale L J at 721 (cited in note 2). On those facts, the organizers of
the holding company undertook real risks (with their stockholdings in other corporations),
and the transaction had the potential of creating real productivities. But even taking these
facts into account, it remains unclear why the controlling shareholders could not have
achieved the same productivities by forming a holding company after or in addition to split-
ting the stock of the savings and loan. In any event, the basis on which the court adjudi-
cated the case was that the sole function of the holding company was to hold the majority's
stock in the one corporation and to effectively split that stock by re-issuing shares in the
holding company. That is thus the only extent of its precedent even if it mischaracterized
the actual facts.
200 Some commentators have critiqued Ahmanson on the ground that it allowed the
minority shareholders to share in the benefits of the transaction without incurring the risks.
See Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.3 at 490 (cited in note 3); Easterbrook and Fischel, 91 Yale
L J at 721 (cited in note 2). But Ahmanson held only that the opportunity must be offered
to the minority shareholders. 460 P2d at 476. Those who decline the risks can be denied the
benefits.
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class, to the transaction.20 1 True, the plaintiff did not consent to
the transaction, but that could easily have reflected free-rider or
holdout problems.20 2 The classwide vote suggests that the expected
value of the transaction was positive for all shareholders, and thus
productive. And, indeed, there were other prospective indications
the transaction would be beneficial. 203 The recapitalization allowed
the corporation's stock to be listed on stock exchanges, and may
have made it easier to sell the corporation's stock or to merge with
other corporations. 4 It also possibly lessened the risk of misman-
agement or management entrenchment by increasing accountabil-
ity to the equity holders and the market for corporate control.20 5
Further, the overdeterrence created by an equal sharing rule
would here be truly intolerable. Given the sort of recapitalization
at issue, there was no reason to expect the controlling shareholders
to agree to transfer control unless they received some premium un-
available to the noncontrolling shareholders. 06 The reason is not
simply that, as the court stressed, the market value of the Class A
stock was greater.0 7 That is also true for controlling shares, and
one might generally expect controlling shareholders to try to bar-
gain for a greater per share price. Rather, here the key was that
the transaction was essentially a closed bargain between control-
201 Less persuasive is the argument that the Class B shareholders consented ex ante
because they knew they were not getting voting rights when they acquired their shares. See
Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.4 at 493 (cited in note 3) (making this argument). After all,
noncontrolling shareholders also know they are not getting control when they buy their
shares. This does not mean that Class B or other noncontrolling shareholders have con-
sented to any sale of voting power or control that might occur. In establishing a default rule,
the best corporate law can do is to assume the parties would have consented to the rule that
produces the greatest wealth for the participants. See Easterbrook and Fischel, 91 Yale L J
at 700-03 (cited in note- 2). Under this Article's analysis, this means that they would not
consent to a nonsharing rule for sales of control that seemingly increase the risk of control
abuses.
202 See text accompanying notes 95-97.
202 There were retrospective indications as well: the stock value of Class B stock in-
creased. See Honigman, 208 F Supp at 757. But, as usual, other factors may have influenced
this change. See id. In any event, retrospective indicators are not as important here: the key
is whether the prospective indicators are sufficiently negative to trigger the buyer screening
incentives imposed on sellers by the equal sharing rule.
204 Id at 761-62; Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.4 at 493-94 (cited in note 3).
205 Honigman, 208 F Supp at 765; Clark, Corporate Law § 11.4.4 at 493-94.
200 One should distinguish the argument here from the observation that Class A had the
power to block the transaction unless they received payment. Compare Clark, Corporate
Law § 11.4.4 at 493 (rebutting this power-based argument). The power to block does not
necessarily entail the property right to sell a willingness not to block. The key here is that
the Class A shareholders would never have any incentive to agree to a beneficial recapitali-
zation unless they were specially compensated.
207 See Honigman, 208 F Supp at 757-58.
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ling and noncontrolling shareholders. There were no third-party
stock purchasers who could provide a financial boon that might,
even if distributed equally among all shareholders, entice the con-
trolling shareholder into agreeing to the transaction. The only ones
who could pay them for giving up their voting power were the
Class B shareholders,2 0 8 and any payment from Class B sharehofd-
ers means that the Class A shareholders have to receive a premium
unavailable to Class B shareholders.
The closed nature of the transaction also raises a practical
problem with trying to impose a sharing duty. The fact that some
premium had to be paid to Class A means that an equal sharing
rule is impossible. But if one rejects equal sharing, and also rejects
unequal division, one is left without any clear alternative stan-
dards of fairness for judging the transaction. Courts would be in
the position of informing Class A and B shareholders that they
must share "enough," but not everything. Given-the lack of alter-
native standards, it hardly seems unwise to rely on a division of
the gains that garnered the consent of each class of shareholders.
V. MANDATORY OR DEFAULT RULE?
A major remaining issue is whether the current triggering ap-
proach should be mandatory or instead a default rule subject to
alteration by each corporation. Those who have accepted the argu-
ment so far would agree that the current triggering rule is gener-
ally more efficient than the deregulatory and equal sharing rules.209
But not every corporation is the same. It may be that some corpo-
rations would do better under rules different from current doctrine
because value-decreasing control transfers seem particularly likely
or unlikely for that corporation. Should corporations accordingly
be able to opt out of the current triggering rule? The answer to
this question turns in part on the timing and content of the altera-
tion to the default triggering rule.
"0I Any immediate increase in corporate value resulting from having voting power more
widely distributed might increase the value of each share on the stock market, but this
would provide little gain to Class A shareholders because they held only 0.1% of the equity.
209 This would, to leading corporate contractarians, justify making the triggering ap-
proach the default rule governing sales of control, but would not justify preventing corpora-
tions from opting out of it. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law 14-15, 35-39, 90-93, 110-11, 119-24 (Harvard, 1991). Ian Ayres
and Robert Gertner have offered arguments for why an inefficient default should sometimes
be chosen, but, as I discuss below, these arguments actually strengthen the case for making
the triggering approach the default. See text accompanying notes 223-25.
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Consider first a corporation that had no special provision
about sales of control in its initial charter but which now seeks to
adopt the deregulatory rule. Unanimous shareholder consent
should suffice to waive any equal sharing obligation triggered by
the current doctrinal rule; indeed, the obligation's rationale is in
part that noncontrolling shareholders would consent to those pre-
mium control sales that are beneficial.2 10 But corporations should
not be able to adopt the deregulatory rule by nonunanimous char-
ter amendment because that would effectively give control sellers,
who are likely to control the charter amendment process, the
power to unilaterally suspend the current rule. This they would
have an incentive to do whether or not the change was beneficial to
the corporation.2 11 Indeed, such a unilateral power would render
the current rule nugatory and leave the deregulatory rule, rather
than the triggering rule, the effective rule of default, because in
practice nothing would prevent the controlling shareholder from
selling at a premium whenever he wished. Nor, in those rare cases
where the controlling shareholder loses control over the charter
amendment process, should an amendment be allowed that adopts
the equal sharing rule over the objections of the controlling share-
holder. That would give the other shareholders the power to expro-
priate part of the value of the control block, which they will have
an incentive to do even where the equal sharing rule would not be
efficient.
A more difficult question is whether corporations should be
able to alter current sale of control doctrine in the initial corporate
charter.212 The corporate contractarian argument for allowing al-
terations to standard corporate rules at the initial charter stage is
that, because each shareholder will have purchased his shares with
the alteration already in place, he will have implicitly consented to
the alteration. Further, because the alteration affects the market
price at which the shares sell, the initial promoter of the corpora-
210 See text accompanying note 74.
211 See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
Colum L Rev 1549, 1573-85 (1989) (discussing opportunistic amendment problem); Lucian
Bebchuck, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on
Charter Amendments, 102 Harv L Rev 1820, 1835-47 (1989) (same).
212 See generally Bebchuck, 89 Colum L Rev at 1395-1408 (cited in note 211) (arguing
that corpordtions should have more freedom to opt out of corporate legal rules at the initial
charter stage than at midstream).
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tion has incentives to include only those alterations that increase
corporate value.213
The problem with this position is that noncontrolling share-
holders, particularly those holding diversified portfolios, generally
cannot afford to incur the information costs of examining and eval-
uating each charter provision for each corporation in which they
buy shares. The pricing of initial charter provisions is thus likely
to reflect asymmetric information because the promoter knows far
more than the potential noncontrolling investors about the provi-
sions and their desirability. Under such circumstances, a "market
for lemons" can develop if alterations to the standard efficient rule
are allowed.214 Investors lacking (and unable to afford) knowledge
about specific charters (and their desirability for specific corpora-
tions) will simply discount all corporate stock by the expected dis-
value of alterations that decrease corporate value. Promoters will
in turn have incentives to adopt alterations that benefit themselves
(or the informed buyer of a control block), even if they decrease
overall corporate value, because the price at which the promoters
can sell noncontrolling shares will be discounted whether or not
the alteration is adopted.
To illustrate, consider a promoter keeping fifty percent of a
new corporation's stock and selling fifty percent to the public. Sup-
pose that the most efficient rule for the corporation would be the
current triggering rule, under which the corporation's stock would
be worth $200/share. A charter provision adopting the less efficient
deregulatory rule would have an expected benefit of $1/share for
the controlling shareholder and an expected disvalue of $2/share
for the other shareholders. Suppose further that purchasers of non-
controlling shares would have to incur $3/share in information
costs to discover and evaluate the rule the corporation has adopted
in its charter. It follows that no purchaser of noncontrolling shares
will find it profitable to examine the corporate charter, and that
the noncontrolling shares will sell for the same price whether or
not the deregulatory rule is adopted. The promoter thus has every
incentive to adopt the deregulatory rule in the initial charter, since
it would increase the value of his control block without affecting
2' See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
Colum L Rev 1416, 1429-33 (1989).
214 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum L Rev
1461, 1522-23 (1989); George A. Akerloff, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q J Econ 488 (1970).
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the price at which he can sell the noncontrolling shares. 15 Because
each promoter in the market would have this incentive to intro-
duce value decreasing provisions, the return on all noncontrolling
shares will drop, as will the price noncontrolling investors are will-
ing to pay. The upshot is that, where such asymmetric information
problems exist, allowing the initial charter to alter the generally
most efficient rule will depress the price at which initial issues sell,
saddle corporations with inefficient rules, and increase the costs of
raising equity capital. Promoters and shareholders will both be
worse off.
The contractarian response to this argument is that profes-
sional advisors and sophisticated investors will, through advice or
their own trading, inform other investors and cause accurate pric-
ing of charter provisions in the stock market. 16 But this misses the
point. If the information costs of absorbing and assessing differ-
ences in specific corporate charters exceed the possible disvalue
from those differences, then it will not be profitable to pay for, or
spend the time compiling or listening to, an analysis of those provi-
sions. This will be true whether or not the investors are "sophisti-
cated" or "professional," as long as their stake in the particular
corporation is not l arge.2 17
In reaching the contrary conclusion that charter provisions are
never mispriced, the contractarian argument assumes that "sophis-
ticated" or "professional" investors face extremely low information
costs. The implicit model is that sophisticated investors already
have formed a general opinion about the value or disvalue of par-
ticular corporate rules and thus need incur only the low cost of
looking at the particular corporate charter and adding or sub-
215 A promoter selling 100% of the corporation, 50% to one controlling shareholder and
50% to noncontrolling shareholders, would have the same incentives because the informa-
tion costs per share are far lower for the controlling shareholder than for the noncontrolling
shareholders. The controlling shareholder will thus be informed about the value of the alter-
ation and be willing to pay $1 a share more if the deregulatory rule is adopted, whereas the
other uninformed shareholders will pay the same either way.
216 See Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 Colum L Rev at 1430-31, 1435 (cited in note 213);
Gordon, 89 Colum L Rev at 1556-67 (cited in note 211). See generally Ronald J. Gilson and
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va L Rev 549, 569-72
(1984) (explaining how professionally informed trading enhances the efficiency of the stock
market).
2 It is consistent with this analysis that initial public offerings are in fact systemati-
cally underpriced. See Gordon, 89 Colum L Rev at 1559-60 and nn 35-39 (cited in note 211)
(collecting studies). While other factors are also relevant, one partial explanation for this
underpricing is that it reflects asymmetric information because current law already allows
considerable variation at the initial charter stage in the rules affecting share value. Allowing
more variation could exacerbate this underpricing.
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tracting the values generated by that general opinion. 18 But since
the whole point of allowing corporations to customize corporate
rules is that the best rule varies for different corporations, the
value or disvalue of each rule will (by hypothesis) vary with the
specific characteristics of each corporation. Thus, investor knowl-
edge about which rule is in the corporation's charter will not suf-
fice-even when coupled with a general understanding of the der-
egulatory, equal sharing, and triggering rules. The investor must
also, assuming customization is beneficial, have detailed knowledge
about the particular corporation under consideration. This will re-
quire high information costs that no investors, sophisticated or
otherwise, will find worth incurring unless they are purchasing a
sufficiently large stake in that particular corporation.
The argument that professional investors will assure that
charter provisions are accurately priced also relies on a false im-
plicit assumption: that the value of the provision is the same for all
shareholders. If this implicit assumption is true, and we have
enough informed investors, then they may well ensure that corpo-
rate stock is not significantly underpriced because in their search
for profits they would buy (and thus bid up the price of) any
shares selling at a substantial but false discount.219 But, as just ex-
plained, the investors who find it worthwhile to become informed
will be those who purchase relatively large stakes-in other words,
those most likely to participate in a controlling group of sharehold-
ers. The value these shareholders would put on a charter provision
adopting the deregulatory rule would differ from that of other
shareholders because, even when the rule is inefficient, it has dis-
tributional effects favoring the controlling shareholders. Thus, to
the extent uninformed shareholders would rely on the market price
influenced by those purchasing a large enough stake to become in-
formed, they could easily be misled.
218 See Gordon, 89 Colum L Rev at 1557 n 26 (cited in note 211). As a repeat player,
the sophisticated or professional investor can spread over many transactions the informa-
tion costs of forming this general opinion and of developing expertise about the desirability
and mechanics of examining corporate charters. See Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 Colum L
Rev at 1435 (cited in note 213) (stressing that professional investors are repeat players).
219 I say "significantly" underpriced and "substantial" discount because professional in-
vestors (1) will have to sacrifice some risk diversification by purchasing extra shares in a
particular corporation, see Booth, 79 Cal L Rev at 1083 (cited in note 82), and (2) will only
find it profitable to search for undervalued corporations if the price differential exceeds the
information costs of evaluating the corporate charter. (Note also that, if variations are al-
lowed, extra information costs will have to be incurred checking each charter whether or not
the particular corporation has opted out of the default rule). Similar factors might explain
why initial public offerings are already somewhat underpriced. See note 217.
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Accordingly, an alteration to current sale of control doctrine
should be allowed at the initial charter stage only if the alteration
does not raise asymmetric information problems or those problems
have been corrected. Although asymmetric information is wide-
spread, it does not create problems unless the alteration has distri-
butional effects harmful to the less informed. Adopting an equal
sharing rule in the initial corporate charter would, for example, not
raise asymmetric information problems because it does not benefit
the promoter or controlling shareholder at the expense of less
knowledgeable shareholders. A promoter thus has incentives to
adopt an equal sharing provision only if it efficiently increases the
price for noncontrolling shares more than it decreases the price for
controlling shares. Therefore, an equal sharing rule adopted in an
initial charter should be enforceable even if it is generally not as
efficient as the triggering rule.
In contrast, adopting the deregulatory rule would, as just ex-
plained, raise asymmetric information problems. It should thus be
invalid unless those problems have been corrected: that is, unless
each purchasing shareholder has provided affirmative detailed con-
sent to the alteration after being fully informed about its possible
consequences and any corporation-specific information bearing on
it. To be sure, the costs of correcting the asymmetric information
problem by obtaining such detailed informed consent will often be
too high to allow the adoption of the deregulatory rule even when
it would be efficient. But these high information costs are the same
ones that would prevent noncontrolling investors from spotting
inefficient alterations. The burden of the information costs neces-
sary to make the contracting process a reliable method of deter-
mining which rules are efficient for specific corporations has to be
put somewhere, and it seems sensible to place the information cost
burden on those seeking to change whichever rule is, as a general
default, considered most likely to be efficient.
Although the case law is scanty and indirect, the above analy-
sis largely conforms to what courts would most likely hold under
existing law. As a general matter, the fiduciary duty of loyalty, of
which sale of control doctrine is a subset, cannot be substantially
weakened in the initial charter or in midstream.220 This would nor-
mally bar a charter provision that purported to eliminate liability
for premium control sales that violated current sale of control doc-
trine. But it would not bar a provision in the original charter that
20 See Eisenberg, 89 Colum L Rev at 1470 n 43 (cited in note 214); John Coffee, The
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law, 89 Colum L Rev 1618, 1648-50 (1989).
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went beyond traditional fiduciary duties by requiring every sale of
control to be shared with all shareholders.
I am not aware of any case that has adjudicated the validity of
a provision allowing unshared premium control sales when that
provision was in the initial charter and was fully explained to all
shareholders before they purchased their shares. It may be that in
such a case a court would agree with my conclusion that a suffi-
ciently reliable contractual process should be allowed to refine the
meaning of the controlling shareholder's duty of loyalty. There is
indirect support for this in the case law that has, where the share-
holders were fully informed, sustained provisions permitting speci-
fied transactions between the corporation and corporate fiducia-
ries21 and upheld understandings that corporate directors and
officers could pursue specified business opportunities that might
otherwise be deemed corporate opportunities.2 2 But the matter
does not appear to have arisen in sale of control cases, perhaps
because, even for those corporations where the deregulatory rule
would be the most efficient rule, its benefits are insufficient com-
pared to the high information costs of fully explaining the provi-
sion to each shareholder.
To the extent the default rule governing control sales is or
should be alterable, the case for making the triggering approach
the default is strengthened by Ian Ayres's recent arguments that a
muddy conditional rule should often be the default even if most
corporations would find it less efficient than a clear unconditional
rule.223 He reasons that those corporations that prefer the clear un-
conditional rule could easily contract for it if it were not the de-
fault. Those that prefer the muddy conditional rule would have
more trouble contracting for it, both because a muddy conditional
rule is difficult to write down and because its muddy nature would
produce more interpretational ambiguity.224 Thus, even if the
221 Everett v Phillips, 288 NY 227, 43 NE2d 18 (1942). See also In re Reading Co., 711
F2d 509 (3d Cir 1983) (giving effect to shareholder agreement specifying permissible self-
dealing contract); Nelkin v. H.J.R. Realty Co., 25 NY2d 543, 307 NYS2d 454, 255 NE2d 713
(1954) (same).
22" See Burg v Horn, 380 F2d 897 (2d Cir 1967).
22. See Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook
& Fischel, 59 U Chi L Rev 1391, 1403-13 (1992). See also Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner
Filling Gaps In Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J
87, 93, 95 (1989).
" Making a muddy rule the default reduces this ambiguity because the default rule
will be interpreted by a unified body of precedent whereas different contractual versions of
the muddy rule would receive varying interpretations. See Ayres, 59 U Chi L Rev at 1406 &
n 31 and (cited in note 223).
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muddy conditional rule is inefficient for most corporations, making
it the default will result in a final equilibrium of corporate rules
that is more efficient than would result if the unconditional rule
were the default.22 5
Current sale of control doctrine is precisely the sort of muddy
conditional rule that would be difficult to write into any corporate
charter and even more difficult to interpret. Parties would have a
much easier time writing a provision that always or never required
the sharing of a sale of control. Thus, even if the triggering ap-
proach were not, as I argue, generally the most efficient rule, Ay-
res's argument would suggest that it is still the best default rule as
long as it represents the most efficient rule for a significant per-
centage of corporations.
While this should persuade those corporate contractarians who
fall into the Ayres camp, I must confess that I myself have doubts
about his analysis. To begin with, Ayres assumes that the costs of
contracting around the default rule are trivial for unconditional al-
ternatives.226 I doubt, however, that the costs of contracting
around the default rule are as low as Ayres believes, particularly if
one includes (as I think one must) the costs of sufficiently inform-
ing shareholders about the explicit contract terms to make the con-
tracting process a reliable method of determining efficient corpo-
rate rules. This leads me to conclude that the default muddy rule
of current doctrine will almost always stick (as indeed observation
suggests), and that it is only justifiable if indeed it is generally the
most efficient.
An even bigger problem has been suggested by Ayres himself.
A state could, if it wished, provide in its corporation statute that
using certain magic words in the corporate charter means the cor-
poration has adopted the muddy conditional rule.2 2 But this
226 An illustration may help. Suppose an unconditional rule would be the most efficient
rule for 80% of corporations, and that a muddy conditional rule would be most efficient for
the other 20%. Suppose also that, while all corporations that desired to could contract for
the unconditional rule if it were not the default, only half of the corporations that desired to
could contract for the conditional rule if it were not the default. Under these assumptions,
choosing the unconditional rule as the default will result in 90% of the corporations having
the most efficient rule for them. (The 80% that benefit from the unconditional rule will
stick with it, and half of the other 20% will switch). But choosing the conditional rule as the
default will result in all 100% of the corporations having the most efficient rule for them.
(The 20% that benefit from the conditional rule will stick with it, and the other 80% will all
switch). In these circumstances, the conditional rule should be made the default even
though the unconditional rule is more efficient for four out of five corporations.
"I See Ayres, 59 U Chi L Rev at 1397, 1406, 1414 (cited in note 223).
221 Id at 1416 n 45.
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means that a state can make it as easy for corporations to contract
for a fuzzy conditional rule as for a clear unconditional rule. Ac-
cordingly, wherever an unconditional rule is generally more effi-
cient, it makes less sense for a state to make the conditional rule
the default than it does for the state to couple a decision to make
the unconditional rule the default with a "magic words" provision,
making it easy to contract for the conditional rule.
In short, if the deregulatory rule were more efficient for most
corporations, it would seem to me that corporation codes should
make it the default, but state that any corporation can choose the
current triggering approach by stating in its charter certain magic
words, such as: "Sales of controlling blocks of stock will be covered
by the traditional sale of control doctrine." Nonetheless, although
we might reach our conclusions through a different route, those
who remain in the Ayres camp should be led to the same conclu-
sion that I reach: that the current triggering approach should be
the default rule governing corporate sales of control.228
"' Arguably cutting the other way is Ayres's separate argument that corporate law
should sometimes embody "penalty defaults" that are not themselves efficient but induce
parties to reveal the information necessary to reach efficient customized contracts. See id at
1397-1400; Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 97-100, 128 (cited in note 223); Ian Ayres and
Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules,
101 Yale L J 729, 760-61 (1992). One might conclude from this that the default rule should
be the equal sharing rule, even if it is less efficient than the triggering approach, because the
equal sharing rule would induce controlling shareholders who want a greater share of the
profits to include explicit charter provisions adopting either the triggering approach or the
deregulatory rule. Compare Ayres, 59 U Chi L Rev at 1399-1400 (cited in note 223) (arguing
that a penalty default should perhaps require target managers to share the gains from a
takeover with all the shareholders because managers can contract otherwise if it would be
more efficient).
It seems to me, however, that the persuasiveness of the penalty default argument de-
pends critically on the sort of information sought to be forced out in the open. Where the
information is necessary to prevent an uninformed party from mispricing the contract, then
the argument for a penalty default that forces its disclosure often has force. See, for exam-
ple, id at 1398 (proposing penalty defaults that induce corporations to reveal any under-
capitalization to creditors).
But where, as here, the only information elicited by the suggested penalty default is
that one of the parties would like to change the default, then the argument for a penalty
default seems dubious. In such a case, a penalty default would encourage customized con-
tracting whenever the gains from altering the penalty default exceed the costs of con-
tracting. Because these gains will (by definition) tend to exceed the gains from customizing
the generally most efficient rule (that's what makes the default a "penalty"), the penalty
default should produce more explicit contracting than the generally efficient default would.
And since such customized contracts will tend to maximize efficiency, the final contractual
equilibrium may be more efficient than if the generally most efficient rule were chosen as
the default. But overall efficiency, net of contracting costs, would not be enhanced by choos-
ing the penalty default. This is because the penalty would inefficiently induce customized
contracting even where the contracting costs exceed the efficiency gains of customizing the
. 1992] 1531
The University of Chicago Law Review
CONCLUSION
All doctrine faces a problem. No matter what the law says,
some undesirable conduct will remain underdeterred, and some de-
sirable conduct will remain overdeterred. Tradeoffs are inevitable.
What is intriguing about current sale of control doctrine is that it
does not optimize behavior by simply choosing the one rule that
seems to embody the best tradeoff between overdeterrence and un-
derdeterrence. Instead, in a way that has before gone unap-
preciated, current doctrine effectively triggers either the equal
sharing or deregulatory approach, depending on which is best
suited for the situation. In this way, it achieves an optimization of
behavior better than could be obtained by any one rule.
Understanding this function of the doctrine helps illuminate
many perplexing issues under current sale of control doctrine. But
the analysis here has lessons not just for corporate sales of control,
but for all legal doctrine. Namely, the analysis shows that, in any
legal area, a quest for the one best legal rule can be misguided.
Often it is better to apply a variety of rules, triggered by a rougher
meta-rule, than to apply any one rule. This analysis applies not
only in corporate law, but whenever the choice of legal rule hinges
on the characteristics of the case mix and a meta-rule can be
crafted to roughly sort cases into different classes appropriate to
different rules. In particular, this Article suggests the potential de-
sirability of a triggering doctrine whenever the contending candi-
dates for a legal rule include a narrow rule that decreases
overdeterrence but increases underdeterrence and a broad rule
that decreases underdeterrence but increases overdeterrence.
generally most efficient rule, which are the only real gains from choosing a penalty default
over a generally efficient default.
In contrast, adopting a generally efficient default will encourage customized contracting
only when the efficiency gains from customizing the generally most efficient rule exceed the
costs of customizing. The final contractual equilibrium may not be as efficient. But the final
state net of contracting costs will be, because contracting will be encouraged only where the
benefits of customization exceed its costs. (Where the alternative to a penalty default is not,
as here, a general default but rather a set of tailored defaults concerning what the parties
"would have wanted," the analysis is somewhat different because a penalty default might
discourage the parties from shifting the costs of customization onto a publicly subsidized
judicial process. See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 93, 97-98. 127-28 (cited in note 224).)
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